On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: Please tell me if above helped.Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures,if you want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", orPlatonia, " is completely consistent with my thinking

OK.

Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, whichshould be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/shewould provide evidence against digital mechanism.Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhapsdistinguishable,perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.

`Where do that comes from? You seem to assume a primary world, made of`

`those compact manifold (which needs arithmetic or Turing equivalent to`

`be defined)`

These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp.

`Biological organism emulates easily Robinson Arithmetic, as all`

`computers do. Universal system are everywhere, and string theory is`

`such a system. To get a toe with comp, we shopuld start by the simpler`

`one (needed the fewest K bits description). It seems to me.`

Bruno

On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.[if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say isempirically likely]Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how isduplication possible?It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simpleanswer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we*bet* that there is a level of description where we can be coded"into a number" and emulated by a Turing universal machine, orequivalently, emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, orits sigma_1 complete part).Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, toillustrate the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecularlevel, with a classical average on elementary interaction betweenthe 'particles'.2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix stateof the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local clusterof galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level ofthe "right" fields, or at the level of elementary strings andbranes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedingerpicture if you prefer. No collapse!Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler touse in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before"jumping" into UD* at step 7.Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as itexists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels,with all oracles, infinitely often.Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very lowlevel. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digitalencoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of thebrain and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy ofmany slight variants, making the theory working through some digitalencodings.Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should bedefined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involvingall universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardlyclonable.But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrowbodies. We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories(the 1p view in the computations where you survive).We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person)are already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical truerelations in between possible universal numbers and other(arithmetical) entities.If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, youhave still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer,quantum mind) or not.The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes fromthe fact that1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeitvery slowly)2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big arethe delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the samequestion.Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high level,to simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a nonstopping UD run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is yourlevel.If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantumdoctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does notchange the consequences.To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which shouldbe shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/shewould provide evidence against digital mechanism.Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, itappears more and more unbelievable.It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truthof comp, I just study the consequences.BrunoOn Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, andwithout thinking to muchon the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning" theorem.The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem withoutassuming physics.I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumventsthat theorem.But do not understand your argument.It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertaintyprinciple.Could you discuss this?The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how faryou go in the UD-Argument.If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all weneed to assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universalformalism/theory, and I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in thearithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity ofcomputations (or of finite piece of computations: the first personwill not see the difference) going through your state, defined bysome substitution level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparentmatter", there will be an infinity of computations needed todescribe exactly that matter (the global FPI domain in arithmetic).This makes a priori the apparent primitive matter non-clonable. Theprimitive matter is literally a statistical sum on infinity ofhistories/computations, and you need the entire running of the UDto define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a prioriduplicable.So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this(which *proves* nothing, to be sure).If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantumlevel (that is for example the position and impulsion of ourparticles at the Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) thenquantum mechanics will be exactly derivable from comp. If oursubstitution level is below the Heisenberg uncertainty level, (wewould have a quantum brain/computer) then things are more complex.As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, the reversalphysics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be thefundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximationof an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt thisfrom the evidences both from introspection, biology and physics.If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM canstill be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can begeographical (and thus variable in the whole of the physicalreality).We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by theUDA before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficultquestion.BrunoRichardOn Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:Hi ListI haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought youmight be interested in this article from the Science Daily online magazineNeural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain InjuryYes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but thehuman will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking tomuch on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegallong ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms theuse of comp by biological system all the time.BrunoGeorge Levy --You received this message because you are subscribed to theGoogle Groups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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