Bruno: Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA.
Richard: I am proposing that the finite 3D array of 10^90/cc compact space particles are a computer for implementing RA. I must have used the word emulation improperly. On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can > still be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical > (and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality). > > Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant > across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are > to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space, > but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level > and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at > a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology. > > > Why do you want emulate RA? Simple animals emulates RA, billiard ball, Gàc > gas, your computer, yourself, all emulate RA. > > The interesting thing would be to not only show that RA emulates the > particles and waves in the mind of PA, ZF, you and me and other "observers > in RA", but to show that such an emulation is statistical stable with > respect to the FPI (which is the difficult task) to do). > > Bruno > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. >> >> Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures, if >> you want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, " >> is completely consistent with my thinking >> >> Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which >> should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. >> If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she >> would provide evidence against digital mechanism. >> >> Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps >> distinguishable, >> perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime >> sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. >> >> These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp >> if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; >> amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, >>> qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. >>> [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is >>> empirically likely] >>> >>> Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication >>> possible? >>> >>> >>> >>> It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple >>> answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that >>> there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a number" and >>> emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in >>> arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). >>> >>> Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate >>> the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with. >>> >>> 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular >>> level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the >>> 'particles'. >>> >>> 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of >>> the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of >>> galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" >>> fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with >>> 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No >>> collapse! >>> >>> Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use >>> in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before "jumping" >>> into UD* at step 7. >>> >>> Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it >>> exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with all >>> oracles, infinitely often. >>> >>> Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. >>> Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of >>> our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving >>> species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making >>> the theory working through some digital encodings. >>> >>> Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be >>> defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all >>> universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. >>> >>> But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. >>> We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in >>> the computations where you survive). >>> >>> We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are >>> already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in >>> between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities. >>> >>> If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have >>> still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind) >>> or not. >>> The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the >>> fact that >>> >>> 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very >>> slowly) >>> 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the >>> delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question. >>> >>> >>> Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high level, to >>> simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non stopping UD >>> run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your level. >>> >>> If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum >>> doctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change the >>> consequences. >>> >>> To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be >>> shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. >>> If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she >>> would provide evidence against digital mechanism. >>> >>> Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it appears >>> more and more unbelievable. >>> It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine. >>> >>> Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth of >>> comp, I just study the consequences. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without >>>> thinking to much >>>> on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival. >>>> >>>> Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the >>>> "no-cloning" theorem. >>>> >>>> >>>> The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming >>>> physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that >>>> theorem. >>>> But do not understand your argument. >>>> It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle. >>>> Could you discuss this? >>>> >>>> >>>> The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you >>>> go in the UD-Argument. >>>> If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need >>>> to assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, >>>> and I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing. >>>> >>>> Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the >>>> arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of >>>> computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not >>>> see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution >>>> level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an >>>> infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global >>>> FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive >>>> matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on >>>> infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the >>>> UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori >>>> duplicable. >>>> >>>> So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, >>>> consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves* >>>> nothing, to be sure). >>>> >>>> If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level >>>> (that is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the >>>> Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be >>>> exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the >>>> Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then >>>> things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, >>>> the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be >>>> the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of >>>> an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the >>>> evidences both from introspection, biology and physics. If our subst level >>>> is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from >>>> arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in >>>> the whole of the physical reality). >>>> >>>> We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA >>>> before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi List >>>>> >>>>> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might >>>>> be interested in this article from the Science >>>>> Daily<http://www.sciencedaily.com/>on line magazine >>>>> >>>>> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain >>>>> Injury<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best, >>>>> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even >>>>> if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will >>>>> say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the >>>>> theoretical consequences of the possible survival. >>>>> >>>>> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long >>>>> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp >>>>> by biological system all the time. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> George Levy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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