On 28 Dec 2013, at 22:40, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, when you wrote:

"...arithmetic ====> number's dreams =====> physics

OK? Physics is based on experience, but not on human one.
And experiences are based on arithmetic/computer-science..."

for the 'unbiased reader ' you started to seem (pardon me!) "incoherent". That entire unfinishable series 'how an adult person can be atheist' seems
overgrown and I wanted to put down my opinion, when Edgar cut me short
with his remark that "first: we need an identification for whatever we call: god".

He is right. We need some definition, or some semi-axiomatic. I have often explained what I mean by the term "God". It is the transcendental reality responsible for our consciousness, and experiences. I can add typical axioms, like the fact that is has no name, and that "shit happens" when we invoke it, etc. The point of the discussion is that we might change the definition, in different ways possible.





Our semantics is premature and insufficient, based on that PARTIAL stuff we
may know at all and formulating FINAL conclusions upon them.

Well, in science, no conclusion is ever final, be it on God, the moon, the boson or even the numbers. We can just hope people agrees enough with a theory to be interested in its theorems.



Ifelt some remark of yours agreeing with me (agnosticism).

Yes, I think that science is agnostic on all ontological commitment, beyond the terms it assumes for the need of solving a problem.




My idrentification for what many people call "god" is known to this list: "infinite complexity" - not better than anyone else's: it is MY belief.

OK. No problem. Arithmetical truth is already infinitely complex, for any machines, so with comp, your definition can satisfy the axioms above, and the machines!






Just to continue MY opinion: whatever we experienc (think?) is HUMAN stuff,

Even Mammal stuff. Even Earthly creature. I fact, I am afraid we borrow already all prejudices and limitations of the Löbian entities, in fact of all finite (locally) machines ...



humanly experienced and thought within human logic, even if we refer to some universal machine 'logic' and 'experience': those are adjusted to our human ways
of thinking.

This might be just  adjusted for John-Mikean thinking.

In fact it is because we adjust our theories that they can be shown wrong, and then we change them.

You cannot use "human" to limit our knowledge a priori, or you just show a prejudice against all humans.

All we, or any creature, can do, is to make clear the theory, and the means to test it. If wrong we change it. Only bad philosophers pretend to know the truth, or to have final conclusion or solution.

Then I like to quote Chardin, saying that we are not human beings having from time to time divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time human experiences.

Bruno




On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 27 Dec 2013, at 16:34, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno,

I have to say that basing reality on the first person experience (or whatever) of humans strikes me as being no different from basing wave collapse on human consciousness.

I agree with you, but I don't do that. The fundamental theory is elementary arithmetic. Experiences are explained by computer science (mainly machine's self-reference and the modal nuances existing by incompleteness).

True: the physical reality comes from the experience, but this is based on the FPI which relies on an objective domain, which comes from arithmetic, not experience. So we have, roughly put:

arithmetic ====> number's dreams =====> physics

OK? Physics is based on experience, but not on human one. And experiences are based on arithmetic/computer-science.

Bruno



Sorry for a naive question but that seems tio be my role on this list.
Richard


On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 24 Dec 2013, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> He did answer and did it correctly,

> I somehow missed that post. What number did Bruno give?

I quote myself:
>>> That's a great answer but unfortunately it's NOT a answer to the question John Clark asked, the question never asked anything about "the 3p view", it was never mentioned. So John Clark will repeat the question for a fifth time: how many first person experiences viewed from their first person points of view does Bruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?

>1  (I already answered this, note)

No you did not.
> from the 1-view, the 1-view is always unique.

That's real nice, but it wasn't the question.

How many unique integers are there in the first 7 billion integers?
John Clark's answer: 7 billion.

How many unique 1-views from 1-view are there on planet Earth right now?
Bruno Marchal's answer: Bruno Marchal refuses to answer.

I answered this two times already. The answer is 1. Not just right now. Always. The infinitely many 1-views are all unique from their 1-view.



> Can you explain why you ask?

Because Bruno Marchal claims to understand the difference between 1P and 3P and says that John Clark does not. And because Bruno Marchal said "the first person experiences viewed from their first person points of view" and it would greatly help John Clark understand what Bruno Marchal meant by this (assuming anything at all) if John Clark knew approximately how many first person experiences views from their first person points of view existed on planet Earth right now.
It is a simple question, what is the number?

In the 3-views on the 1-views, there are right now about 7.10^6 such human 1-view.
In the 1-view there is only one, from her 1-view.

OK?

This explains the existence of the 1-indeterminacy. If I am duplicated iteratively ten times: the number of 3-1-views will grow exponentially, and after the 10th duplication, there 2^10 1-views. But assuming comp and the default hypotheses, each of the copies get one bit of information, at each duplication step (they write W or they wrote M, never both). All of them feel constantly unique, and the vast majority get a non computable history when iterating infinitely (or incompressible when iterating finitely a long enough time).

You seem to have understood the point, and in a recent post to Jason you seem to assess steps 3, 4, 5, 6.

So what about step 7?
How do you predict "conceptually" the result of any physical experiences and experiments, when assuming a physical universe, and assuming it executes integrally (without ever stopping) a Universal Dovetailer?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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