On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) >> quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N >> qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only >> retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it >> doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers. >> >> >> >> OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits >> depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all >> results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N >> computations have to occur in *some* sense. >> >> >> But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist >> in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore >> there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. >> What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference >> terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit >> outputs. >> > > Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real > question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many > minds). > > > Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a > classical computer can support consciousness. > Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views. That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states, which you call "calculation fictions". Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
