On 30 Dec 2013, at 23:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is
(presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum
computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to
specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of
information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it
doesn't
really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N
bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier
transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This
means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot
exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum
computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain
these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is
the one can regard all those interference terms as mere
calculation fictions
in
going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's
the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-
worlds (or at least many minds).
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor
implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the
computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting
conscious states, and first person views.
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is
nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very
bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a
classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";
"ability"
whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think
consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context
of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer
can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical
computation is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum
computation is the superposition of many classical computations,
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally
true then N qubits could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but
they can't.
That does not follow. They can't because QM predicts that they can't
interact, but the interference needs them to exist, in some physical
non fictitious sense. Without adding a selection principle, like a
collapse, I don't see why self-aware creature in those branches would
lost their consciousness.
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being
done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce an answer.
So you agree that they are computations in parallel. Then we cannot
exploit the results obtained in the parallel world directly, as we
would lost the information in the other branch, but by changing the
base of the outcome-analyser, we can still exploit some amount of
information from the results obtained in *all* other branches (like
seeing if they are all equal, or not).
Bruno
Brent
and if these classical computations instantiate minds, then the
emulation of a mind on a quantum computer gives you many different
conscious states existing at once.
Our own classical world, is based on the quantum, so really, we
don't even need to run a brain simulation in a quantum computer
(that is already what is happening to us today, right now).
So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to
instantiate such a world.
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is
irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate
states,
That's your story and you're sticking to it.
Do you disagree?
It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-
qubit computer. But what it shows is not certain.
Brent
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