On 12/31/2013 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Dec 2013, at 23:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is
(presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum
computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to
specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of
information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't
really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N
bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier
on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that
the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot
exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum
and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these
enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one
can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation
fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the
question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies
classical computer can support consciousness.
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the
that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and
first person views.
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing
about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield
consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";
whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness
least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as
separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind
consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then N qubits
could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't.
That does not follow. They can't because QM predicts that they can't interact, but the
interference needs them to exist, in some/*physical non fictitious sense*/.
That's pretty funny coming from you, Bruno. :-)
Without adding a selection principle, like a collapse, I don't see why self-aware
creature in those branches would lost their consciousness.
The question is why are "they" not us. We remain self-aware while the quantum computer
factors a number, so we're self-aware creatures in the same branch.
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being done in parallel
because they have to interfere to produce an answer.
So you agree that they are computations in parallel.
Sure. I'm just doubtful they constitute "a world".
Then we cannot exploit the results obtained in the parallel world directly, as we would
lost the information in the other branch, but by changing the base of the
outcome-analyser, we can still exploit some amount of information from the results
obtained in *all* other branches (like seeing if they are all equal, or not).
Effectively that's how most quantum computations work, they don't guarantee the right
answer, only a statistically probable answer. So we're relying on the agreement of a lot
of parallel processes to interfere constructively on the right answer.
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