On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



    On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



        On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
        <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

            On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
            But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably)
            quantum.  But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has 
N
            qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you 
can
            only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's 
theorem).  So
            it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.


            OK, but nobody pretended the contrary.  You can still extract N bits
            depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all
            results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N
            computations have to occur in *some* sense.

            But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot 
exist in
            whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and 
therefore
there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference
            terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N 
bit
            outputs.


        Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness?  That's the real
        question.  If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least 
many minds).

        Why is that "the real question"?  Saying yes to the doctor implies that 
a
        classical computer can support consciousness.


    Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations 
that
    support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first 
person
    views.

    Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.


No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?

I'm not sure what you mean by "power"; whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world. So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate such a world.


    That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, 
as all
    the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,

    That's your story and you're sticking to it.



Do you disagree?

It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit computer. But what it shows is not certain.

Brent

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