On 31 Dec 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2013 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Dec 2013, at 23:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is
(presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum
computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers
to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of
information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't
really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract
N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier
transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes".
This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some*
sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it
cannot exist in whole universe, much less in
that
little quantum computer and therefore there must be other
worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What
Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those
interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from
N bit inputs to N bit outputs.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's
the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-
worlds (or at least many minds).
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor
implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the
computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting
conscious states, and first person views.
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is
nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have
very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the
computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";
"ability"
whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think
consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the
context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum
computer can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree
classical computation is what is behind consciousness, so if
quantum computation is the superposition of many classical
computations,
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally
true then N qubits could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but
they can't.
That does not follow. They can't because QM predicts that they
can't interact, but the interference needs them to exist, in some
physical non fictitious sense.
That's pretty funny coming from you, Bruno. :-)
Hmm.... Only for those who believe that I or comp eliminates the
physical reality. But comp eliminates only the primitive physical
reality, and in that way, makes the physical more real and solid, as
it emerges from quite solid laws (addition and multiplication of
integers).
Without adding a selection principle, like a collapse, I don't see
why self-aware creature in those branches would lost their
consciousness.
The question is why are "they" not us.
Comp explains this completely. It is like in the WM-duplication. The
guy in W will never understand why he is the guy in W. The guy in M
will never understand why he is the guy in M. It is magical, but comp
explains why it has to appear like that, unless we add more ad hoc
magic.
We remain self-aware while the quantum computer factors a number, so
we're self-aware creatures in the same branch.
But that branch is defined by the output base {0, 1} of the QC. But
the QC do the computation in the {0', 1'} base, which are
superposition of {0, 1}-realities. In that base we are distributed in
many realities, that we cannot distinguish (unless the QC leaks to our
environment). We are in the same infinities (say) of branches.
You know that a pure state is a superposition of infinitely many
branches. QC just exploits this, thanks to the interference.
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations
being done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce
an answer.
So you agree that they are computations in parallel.
Sure. I'm just doubtful they constitute "a world".
They need just to be enough real to run a computer. And they are as
much world than our branch, or you are using some selection principle
which would give more importance to some branch than to others (like
believing that you are in W, and the guy in M is not really a genuine
"you", but then I am no more sure I survive (in the usual clinical
sense) a self-duplication.
Then we cannot exploit the results obtained in the parallel world
directly, as we would lost the information in the other branch, but
by changing the base of the outcome-analyser, we can still exploit
some amount of information from the results obtained in *all* other
branches (like seeing if they are all equal, or not).
Effectively that's how most quantum computations work, they don't
guarantee the right answer, only a statistically probable answer.
So we're relying on the agreement of a lot of parallel processes to
interfere constructively on the right answer.
OK. And if some of those parallel processes run "a conscious
computer", it has to be conscious with comp, and from the 1p of those
consciousness, they see "a world", like we are seeing a world, so I am
not sure it makes sense to say that the parallel "world" are less real.
Bruno
Brent
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