On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) >>>> quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N >>>> qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only >>>> retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it >>>> doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits >>>> depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all >>>> results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N >>>> computations have to occur in *some* sense. >>>> >>>> >>>> But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist >>>> in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore >>>> there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. >>>> What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference >>>> terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit >>>> outputs. >>>> >>> >>> Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real >>> question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many >>> minds). >>> >>> >>> Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that >>> a classical computer can support consciousness. >>> >> >> Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the >> computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious >> states, and first person views. >> >> >> Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing. >> >> > No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing > "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same > power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. > Do you disagree with this? > > > I'm not sure what you mean by "power"; > "ability" > whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness > (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical > world. > Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical computations, and if these classical computations instantiate minds, then the emulation of a mind on a quantum computer gives you many different conscious states existing at once. Our own classical world, is based on the quantum, so really, we don't even need to run a brain simulation in a quantum computer (that is already what is happening to us today, right now). > So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate > such a world. > > > > >> >> That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is >> irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states, >> >> >> That's your story and you're sticking to it. >> > > > Do you disagree? > > > It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit > computer. But what it shows is not certain. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
