On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is
(presumably)
quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it
has
N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT
you
can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's
theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N
bits
depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom
on all
results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the
2^N
computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot
exist
in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and
therefore there must be other worlds which contain these
enormous
number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can
regard
all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in
going
from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the
real
question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at
least
many minds).
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies
that a
classical computer can support consciousness.
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the
computations
that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states,
and first
person views.
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing
"fictional"
about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield
consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree
with this?
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";
"ability"
whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness
(at least
like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as
separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind
consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical
computations,
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then N qubits could
do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't. The "quantum computations" are not
just classical computations being done in parallel because they have to interfere to
produce an answer.
Brent
and if these classical computations instantiate minds, then the emulation of a mind on a
quantum computer gives you many different conscious states existing at once.
Our own classical world, is based on the quantum, so really, we don't even need to run a
brain simulation in a quantum computer (that is already what is happening to us today,
right now).
So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate
such a world.
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is
irrelevant, as
all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,
That's your story and you're sticking to it.
Do you disagree?
It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit
computer. But
what it shows is not certain.
Brent
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