On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

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On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs. Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness. Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing. No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?I'm not sure what you mean by "power"; "ability" whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen asseparate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behindconsciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classicalcomputations,

`But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then N qubits could`

`do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't. The "quantum computations" are not`

`just classical computations being done in parallel because they have to interfere to`

`produce an answer.`

Brent

and if these classical computations instantiate minds, then the emulation of a mind on aquantum computer gives you many different conscious states existing at once.Our own classical world, is based on the quantum, so really, we don't even need to run abrain simulation in a quantum computer (that is already what is happening to us today,right now).So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate such a world.That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,That's your story and you're sticking to it. Do you disagree?It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit computer. But what it shows is not certain. Brent--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups"Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "EverythingList" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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