On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 5:32 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) >>>>> quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N >>>>> qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only >>>>> retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it >>>>> doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits >>>>> depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all >>>>> results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N >>>>> computations have to occur in *some* sense. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot >>>>> exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and >>>>> therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number >>>>> of >>>>> bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those >>>>> interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs >>>>> to N bit outputs. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the >>>> real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least >>>> many minds). >>>> >>>> >>>> Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies >>>> that a classical computer can support consciousness. >>>> >>> >>> Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the >>> computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious >>> states, and first person views. >>> >>> >>> Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing. >>> >>> >> No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing >> "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same >> power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. >> Do you disagree with this? >> >> >> I'm not sure what you mean by "power"; >> > > "ability" > > >> whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think >> consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a >> quasi-classical world. >> > > Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can > be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical computation > is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum computation is the > superposition of many classical computations, > > > But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then > N qubits could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't. > It's not questionable, because it is explained by many-worlds. When you measure any of the particles, you get entangled and see only one of its states (not all the states the particle really carries). > The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being > done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce an answer. > Yes, but I am starting to think you believe quantum computations are more than mere "fictions", since you keep avoiding the question of whether or not multiple conscious states might be supported by a quantum computation. Jason > > Brent > > > and if these classical computations instantiate minds, then the > emulation of a mind on a quantum computer gives you many different > conscious states existing at once. > > Our own classical world, is based on the quantum, so really, we don't > even need to run a brain simulation in a quantum computer (that is already > what is happening to us today, right now). > > >> So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate >> such a world. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is >>> irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states, >>> >>> >>> That's your story and you're sticking to it. >>> >> >> >> Do you disagree? >> >> >> It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit >> computer. But what it shows is not certain. >> >> Brent >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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