How many times do I have to say it before it's clear? Everything in my 
model consists of pure abstract computational information running in the 
real actuality and presence (the logical space) of reality.

There is NO actual physicality whatsoever. As I've said repeatedly, 
physicality, the material world, is how biological organisms interpret the 
information world in their mental models, or simulations, of reality.

To understand the theory this must be clearly understood.


On Thursday, January 9, 2014 11:35:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
> On 10 January 2014 17:19, meekerdb < <javascript:>>wrote:
>>  On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>> No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space 
>> that enables computations to take place since something has to move for 
>> computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for 
>> computations. 
>>  You seem to be nit picking...
>>  Edgar
>> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
>>> No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it 
>>> *is.*
>>> On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <> wrote:
>>>> Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and 
>>>> Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...
>> I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.  It's 
>> seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running 
>> all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that appears on clocks is 
>> a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity 
>> called "energy".
>> Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an 
> abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one can tell, 
> intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what Bruno's ontology is 
> based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms. It isn't clear what Edgar's 
> ontology is based on - he seems to be assuming that time and some form of 
> computation are fundamental properties of the universe, but not what those 
> computers are running on (by Turing equivalence, I assume they COULD be 
> running on a desktop PC in some other universe) or what his "universal 
> present moment" consists of - is it a linear dimensio, say? But then it 
> appears to be quantised, since it only supports discrete computational 
> steps. Can time be quantised? What are the implications? Do things like the 
> Landauer limit come into his theory?
> The concern is, I suspect, due to...
> a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing the 
> theory
> b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from the 
> theory to the observed reality
> c) a bad attitude

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