Stephen,

A couple of responses.

Forget all other theories when you read mine and judge it only on its own 
merits... Don't shoehorn!

Only information is being computed. It exists independent of things. What 
are called 'things' are mental interpretations of computational information 
domains extracted by biological organisms to facilitate their internal 
simulation computations of a continuous reality. 

The information in reality is continuous but it does manifest as domains. 
Humans look at domains and variously simulate them as things. E.g. surfers 
extract waves from a continuous ocean while oceanographers see currents, 
and smelt see tides. There are no individual 'things' in reality because it 
is a continuous computational nexus of information. E.g looking at some 
area of continuous information we can identify either leaves, twigs, 
branches or a whole tree. It's all one continuous information segment but 
minds can separate it into overlapping 'things' to facilitate mental 
computations. If you understand how robots extract 'things' from raw 
sensory input you will understand that. It's a very complex and difficult 
and eventually an artificial process dependent on the structure of the 
observer's mind...

Actually the information world, the fact that all is its information only 
IS directly observable with understanding and practice. I explain this in 
Part VI of my book titled "Realization", that is how to directly experience 
reality as it actually is.

Yes, understanding QM and GR clearly demonstrates reality is not physical. 
But that's just the beginning of actually experiencing it as the pure 
information it actually is.

Edgar







On Monday, January 13, 2014 12:25:54 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Edgar,
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
> Stephen,
>
> It's not 'ideal monism'. Trying to shoehorn it won't help you understand 
> it.
>
>
> Good point! I tend to have a 5 bin system that I use to categorize 
> ontological theories: Material monism, Ideal monism, dualism, pluralism and 
> "other" (which would include the various "mysterianisms"). Isms are useful 
> for quick and dirty sorting, but can lead one into trouble if one does not 
> investigate beyond the surface.
>
>  
>
>
> Just take the pure information content of everything that exists out of 
> the 'things'. You have pure information.
>
>
> It is statements like this one that leads me to put your ideas into the 
> Ideal monism (or Idealism) bin. Have you every  read any commentary on 
> Bishop Berkeley's ideas and arguments? It would be helpful to have some 
> definitions of terms. I use a version of Bateson's definition of 
> information: A distinction between two 'things' that makes a difference to 
> a third thing. I try hard to not use Platonic notions and concepts that 
> imply that 'things' have innate properties and that ignore the role of 
> interactions and observers.
>    I studied semiotics quite a bit (C.S. Peirce's work), it was very 
> useful... 
>
>  
>
>  Now assume that information is continually evolving to compute the 
> current state of reality. 
>
>
> Is this happening independent of 'things' or are things that which are 
> being computed? How is the computation "happening"? If computation is, as I 
> define it, the transformation of information, then it cannot be considered 
> as an action that occurs independent of 'things'.
>
>  
>
> Where does it exist and evolve? Not in a physical world, but in the 
> presence of reality itself. 
>
>
> But that is a problematic idea! "Reality" makes no sense to me if is does 
> not involve that which is observable, and thus considering reality as 
> somehow "independent" requires a method to connect it to the physical. Why 
> add the extra complication?  If the physical world *is* an aspect of the 
> computation (and computations "run" on the physical) and is not independent 
> of the computations, it removes the need to explain the connection between 
> the two realms. They are in essence dual in the mathematical sense of an 
> isomorphism.
>
>  
>
> Only because there is something that exists called reality which supports 
> these computations do they become real and actual...
>
>
> This claim neglects a selection mechanism that would partition the "real 
> and actual" from the "unreal...". Existence is not a property that is 
> contingent on something else. It is pure necessary possibility flowing from 
> non-self-contradiction. One thing one learns from some deep mathematical 
> studies is that there are many theories that contradict each other and yet 
> are self-consistent. It has been proven that theories that include 
> arithmetic will almost always have statements that cannot be proven true or 
> false by the theory...
>
>  
>
>
> Imagine reality as analogous to an ocean, and information as the forms 
> that may arise within that sea, the ripples, waves, currents etc. This 
> information is continually interacting and evolving producing the current 
> state of the ocean. That's a good model for reality. Reality is a 
> non-physical ocean of being, in which the information forms representing 
> all the things of the world continually computationally interact to produce 
> the current information state of reality.
>
>
> I like the continuum metaphor but it falls apart if there is no 
> consideration of the means by which strata and divisions occur within it. I 
> am an avowed disciple of Heraclitus and thus like the "Becoming is 
> fundamental" idea, but one needs to more carefully model how the 
> interactions may occur such that one has a decent model of the 
> stratification of forms comes to pass.
>
>  
>
>
> It's really a pretty simple model. You just need to drop the assumption 
> reality is physical and dimensional at the fundamental level. Why should it 
> be?
>
>
> I dropped the idea that reality is physical and dimensional long ago. I 
> learned detailed knowledge of QM and GR... 
>
>  
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2014 9:08:53 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Edgar,
>
>   Several of us do not understand what you mean by "pure abstract 
> computational information" or "real actuality" and thus cannot evaluate 
> your claims. It would be helpful if you proposed some semi-formal 
> definitions or pointed to similar discussion by other authors. It seems to 
> me that your theory is yet another version of ideal monism and there are 
> quite a few of those floating around.
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
> Liz,
>
> How many times do I have to say it before it's clear? Everything in my 
> model consists of pure abstract computational information running in the 
> real actuality and presence (the logical space) of reality.
>
> There is NO actual physicality whatsoever. As I've said repeatedly, 
> physicality, the material world, is how biological organisms interpret the 
> information world in their mental models, or simulations, of reality.
>
> To understand the theory this must be clearly understood.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 11:35:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 10 January 2014 17:19, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>  On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>  
> No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space 
> that enables computations to take place since something has to move for 
> computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for 
> computations. 
>
>  You seem to be nit picking...
>
>  Edgar
>
> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
>
> No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it 
> *is.*
>  
>
> On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
>
> Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen 
> what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...
>
>     
> I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.  It's 
> seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running 
> all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that appears on clocks is 
> a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity 
> called "energy".
>
> Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an 
> abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one can tell, 
> intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what Bruno's ontology is 
> based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms. It isn't clear what Edgar's 
> ontology is based on - he seems to be assuming that time and some form of 
> computation are fundamental properties of the universe, but not what those 
> computers are running on (by Turing equivalence, I assume they COULD be 
> running on a desktop PC in some other universe) or what his "universal 
> present moment" consists of - is it a linear dimensio, say? But then it 
> appears to be quantised, since it only supports discrete computational 
> steps. Can time be quantised? What are the implications? Do things like the 
> Landauer limit come into his theory?
>
> The concern is, I suspect, due to...
>
> a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing the 
> theory
> b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from the 
> theory to the observed reality
> c) a bad attitude
>
>
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