2014/1/13 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> > Liz, > > How many times do I have to say it before it's clear? Everything in my > model consists of pure abstract computational information running in the > real actuality and presence (the logical space) of reality. > > There is NO actual physicality whatsoever. As I've said repeatedly, > physicality, the material world, is how biological organisms interpret the > information world in their mental models, or simulations, of reality. > > To understand the theory this must be clearly understood. >
So to understand the theory, I have to understand the theory... At least, that's clear. Quentin > > Edgar > > > > On Thursday, January 9, 2014 11:35:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >> >> On 10 January 2014 17:19, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>> >>> No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space >>> that enables computations to take place since something has to move for >>> computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for >>> computations. >>> >>> You seem to be nit picking... >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >>>> >>>> No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it >>>> *is.* >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and >>>>> Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... >>>>> >>>> >>> I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations. It's >>> seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running >>> all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that appears on clocks is >>> a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity >>> called "energy". >>> >>> Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an >> abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one can tell, >> intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what Bruno's ontology is >> based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms. It isn't clear what Edgar's >> ontology is based on - he seems to be assuming that time and some form of >> computation are fundamental properties of the universe, but not what those >> computers are running on (by Turing equivalence, I assume they COULD be >> running on a desktop PC in some other universe) or what his "universal >> present moment" consists of - is it a linear dimensio, say? But then it >> appears to be quantised, since it only supports discrete computational >> steps. Can time be quantised? What are the implications? Do things like the >> Landauer limit come into his theory? >> >> The concern is, I suspect, due to... >> >> a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing the >> theory >> b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from the >> theory to the observed reality >> c) a bad attitude >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
