On 14 January 2014 12:42, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:
> Sigh.... Now we have several people complaining because I haven't offered
> a 'formal theory'. However not a single one of the complainers has
> themselves offered a formal theory even though they are continually
> offering theories of their own, none of which are formalized. Is that fair?
Don't be silly. Special Relativity is formalised, and so is comp.
> The only person on this group who has a formal theory that I'm aware of is
> Bruno. No one else? You don't have one of your own but you are criticizing
> me because I don't have one?
I'm not pretending to have one. You are. So stop whining and get on with
> What you guys don't seem to understand is that whether a theory accurately
> describes reality or not is a much more important criterion than whether
> that theory is formalized or not. Physics described reality quite
> accurately for years before it reached its current degree of formalization
> and that's why it was accepted.
Newtonian physics was completely formalised. It would otherwise have been
> Doesn't really matter whether you have a formal theory or not if there is
> no connection to reality now does there? Bruno's theory is apparently quite
> tightly formalized but I see none of the required actual consistency with
> reality to indicate it actually applies to reality at all.
The same applies to yours, so far. The only consistency with reality you've
come up with so far is you saying repeatedly that it's consistent with
reality. The difference between your vaguely defined theory and Bruno's
formalised one is that Bruno's can be examined, subjected to criticism, and
(in principle) tested against reality. Yours hasn't even reached the stage
where it can be critically examined.
> Bruno's theory may itself be logically consistent, but I see no
> consistency with actual reality. Mine on the other hand is entirely
> consistent with actual reality because it clearly states that the
> computations of its computational reality are precisely what is actually
> necessary to compute the real processes of nature, whatever they are.
Which does at least put it on a par with the invisible pink unicorns
theory, which clearly states that the invisible pink unicorns are precisely
what is actually necessary to compute the real processes of nature,
whatever they are.
> Bruno's on the other hand makes the wild and unsubstantiated assumption
> that all possible math is 'out there' in reality somehow even if it's doing
> nothing. A very improbable assumption there is no empirical evidence for
> whatsoever. Doesn't matter in the least if the logical consequences of that
> initial assumption are tight and valid (a formalized theory) if the
> assumption itself isn't.
The empirical evidence is 500 years of science. How do you explain the
success of maths at describing reality if it isn't 'out there' ? (Bruno
doesn't assume it's "out there in reality" of course; he assumes, as a
hypothesis, that reality is derived from it.)
This is a serious question, which has had various answers, but until you
explain your take on it we are not in a position to evauate your claims
made on the basis that it's false.
> I just hope you guys understand what I'm saying is a basis of scientific
> method. Doesn't matter so much if a theory is formalized. What matters is
> its explanatory power and consistency with actually observed phenomena.
> Neither of which we have as yet. So far the only "explanatory power and
consistency with observed phenomena" we have is that you say it must be so.
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