On 19 Jan 2014, at 00:33, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:11:50AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp does not need actual infinities, but it still needs the
potential infinity of all finite things (integers, or something).

But finitist physicalism

Oops! I meant "ultrafinistism". The idea that the big thing is a finite thing, like in step seven, or apparently in Edgar's ontology.



is indeed a way out of comp. But then your
theory is non-computationalist. Do you say "no" to the doctor. You
have already answer "no", and later "yes", so I am not sure. Which
is it?


I would agree that finitism contradicts comp, because it contradicts
arithmetic realism

Ultrafinitism, yes.




(some numbers are not as real as others), but why
do you suggest that finitism contradicts "Yes doctor"?


Ultrafinitist physicalism is handled by step 8 (MGA).

It can be handled by a stronger use of Occam razor already in step seven, instead.

(To be sure I don't like the idea that the infinitely many creatures which provably exist and have "life" in arithmetic would be zombie. (but that's between us)).

In a sense, those creatures are sort of zombies, because from their own first personal views, they exist on the limit measure on infinitely many computations, and that's something nobody can see. Yet, it has a complex mathematics of its own, whose propositional part is given by the variants of G and G* (assuming classical standard definitions of belief and knowledge). (for the ideally correct machine).

Bruno






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