On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:32, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Dear Bruno, Forgive a small cherry-picking. You wrote:"It does not necessarily make the physical into a mathematicalstructure. It makes the whole coupling consciousness/physicalnessinto an arithmetical internal phenomenon."Can the "arithmetic internal phenomenon" be emulated or mappedfaithfully onto a Boolean or Heyting algebra? If so, what would itsmathematical dual be?

`You can do with diagonal algebra. You can use Heyting algebra for the`

`"& p" hypostases (S4Grz1, X1 and X1*)`

But that is very technical, and I think out of the scope of this list.

`Personally I prefer, for diverse technical reasons, use the Kripke`

`theory, instead of the algebraic approach.`

Bruno

On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 18 Jan 2014, at 22:29, LizR wrote:On 19 January 2014 05:54, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:Dear Bruno,I do not claim that UDA is "flawed". I claim it is incomplete andbased on a false premise. The problem is the assumption that onecan reason as if the physical world does not exist and discussideas that imply the existence of Becoming and measures there of(time) all the while using axioms that forbid their existence. Itis the sound of one hand clapping in a mind that cannot imagine air.I don't see why any of AR implies the existence of becoming.OK. See below.Nor do I understand how Bruno gets computations out indexically.I don't get the computation indexically, unless you mean the indicesof the phi_i.Indexical was referring to the mathematics of self-reference used inAUDA. It is the one obeying G and G*, and whose variants gives theperson points of view (including the "physical one").That the computation are emulated through number relations inarithmetic is quite standard. It is already almost explicit in Gödel1931, although nitpickers could say this only appears really"officially" in Hilbert and Bernays.It is technically easy, but long and tedious to do that in detail.When done, there can be some opposition coming from the fact thatpeople confuse computations (the abstract notion), and theirdescription in term of numbers.If you have an idea how a (von Neumann) computer is functioning, orif you have played with a couple of universal system (machine orlanguage), and have even a rough idea how Gödel's theorem can beproved in arithmetic (= by PA itself), you should not have too muchdifficulty to conceive that the sigma_1 number relations constitutea universal system, and thus emulate all Turing machines and brains.Then AR does the rest (assuming comp 'course).And then you have your explanation of becoming, up to one seriousbut fertile difficulty.Indeed, once you understand that all subjective experiences, whichinclude the subjective feeling of becoming, are emulated inarithmetic, the "illusion" of becoming is explained.The problem is that by the FPI, we must still explain thestatistical persistence of such feelings, and here UDA explains thatsuch persistence can only come from the relative FPI, which can betranslated in math, and that reduce physics to mathematics.It does not necessarily make the physical into a mathematicalstructure. It makes the whole coupling consciousness/physicalnessinto an arithmetical internal phenomenon.Hope this helped a bit, BrunoI suspect you don't, either, so you assume he uses "becoming" - ifso we both need to know exactly what Bruno is arguing actuallyhappens (I use the word under erasure!) before we can have anopinion on whether he's right or not.I have to ask, do you accept block universes? If not imho you'reprobably arguing from a false premise yourself.The UDA can be useful and it is interesting, but it is a castlebuilt in midair and expected to float free because the designerdoes not admit the existence of gravity."That's fighting talk!" :-) --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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