On 24 Jan 2014, at 02:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Among other interesting things, you wrote:
"If you have an idea how a (von Neumann) computer is functioning, or
if you have played with a couple of universal system (machine or
language), and have even a rough idea how Gödel's theorem can be
proved in arithmetic (= by PA itself), you should not have too much
difficulty to conceive that the sigma_1 number relations constitute
a universal system, and thus emulate all Turing machines and brains.
Then AR does the rest (assuming comp 'course)."
We differ most in our interpretation of the word "emulate".
That is related to our difference on computation, but I stick with the
standard mathematical definitions. I invite you to change the word if
you change the concept.
For me, an "emulation" implies some form of physical activity that
acts as the energetic motivation of the functions that are
isomorphic to the "universal system".
I use x emulates y on z, if phi_x (y, z) is executed in arithmetic or
y some other universal number.
My reasoning here is a process based interpretation of the Stone
duality: physical systems are to Stone spaces what logical systems
are to Boolean algebras. The isomorphism between a BA and a Stone
space S(BA) need not be a strictly bijection.
Thus when you write: "emulates a universal system", I parse this
as "some physical system implements the isomorph of the logical
universal system".
There are no universal logical system.
I do not see how what is by definition fixed and timeless can be
considered to have any property that is an actual action.
Then I don't even understand your use of the Stone duality. If that is
not timeless ...
Numbers can *represent* actions, but they are most definitely NOT
actions; there is no evolution associated with them, again, by
definition.
Same for the Stone duality.
My definition of computation reflects this reasoning as well. It
says that the evolution of a physical system is dual to a
computation of the set of representations of that system.
This also requires a weakening of the notion of computational
independence: A universal computation is independent of any
particular physical implementation, but it is not independent of the
class of all physical implementations.
Without defining physical from arithmetic (or any universal number)
you can't satisfy the comp exoplanation of consciousness.
Bruno
On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 18 Jan 2014, at 22:29, LizR wrote:
On 19 January 2014 05:54, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com
> wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I do not claim that UDA is "flawed". I claim it is incomplete and
based on a false premise. The problem is the assumption that one
can reason as if the physical world does not exist and discuss
ideas that imply the existence of Becoming and measures there of
(time) all the while using axioms that forbid their existence. It
is the sound of one hand clapping in a mind that cannot imagine air.
I don't see why any of AR implies the existence of becoming.
OK. See below.
Nor do I understand how Bruno gets computations out indexically.
I don't get the computation indexically, unless you mean the indices
of the phi_i.
Indexical was referring to the mathematics of self-reference used in
AUDA. It is the one obeying G and G*, and whose variants gives the
person points of view (including the "physical one").
That the computation are emulated through number relations in
arithmetic is quite standard. It is already almost explicit in Gödel
1931, although nitpickers could say this only appears really
"officially" in Hilbert and Bernays.
It is technically easy, but long and tedious to do that in detail.
When done, there can be some opposition coming from the fact that
people confuse computations (the abstract notion), and their
description in term of numbers.
If you have an idea how a (von Neumann) computer is functioning, or
if you have played with a couple of universal system (machine or
language), and have even a rough idea how Gödel's theorem can be
proved in arithmetic (= by PA itself), you should not have too much
difficulty to conceive that the sigma_1 number relations constitute
a universal system, and thus emulate all Turing machines and brains.
Then AR does the rest (assuming comp 'course).
And then you have your explanation of becoming, up to one serious
but fertile difficulty.
Indeed, once you understand that all subjective experiences, which
include the subjective feeling of becoming, are emulated in
arithmetic, the "illusion" of becoming is explained.
The problem is that by the FPI, we must still explain the
statistical persistence of such feelings, and here UDA explains that
such persistence can only come from the relative FPI, which can be
translated in math, and that reduce physics to mathematics.
It does not necessarily make the physical into a mathematical
structure. It makes the whole coupling consciousness/physicalness
into an arithmetical internal phenomenon.
Hope this helped a bit,
Bruno
I suspect you don't, either, so you assume he uses "becoming" - if
so we both need to know exactly what Bruno is arguing actually
happens (I use the word under erasure!) before we can have an
opinion on whether he's right or not.
I have to ask, do you accept block universes? If not imho you're
probably arguing from a false premise yourself.
The UDA can be useful and it is interesting, but it is a castle
built in midair and expected to float free because the designer
does not admit the existence of gravity.
"That's fighting talk!" :-)
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