On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness
arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the
brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition.
Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.
If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with
nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing
something obvious?
Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems
so trivial to disprove:
"even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
2. brain generates consciousness but
3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
so comp = ~comp
I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not
afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology
for participating to the discussion with a shift.
What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with
comp (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes
consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical
reality. Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can predict
the physical behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary for
consciousness, then, although a virtual emulation would do (with
different matter), an abstract or arithmetical computation would not
do, by the lack of the primitive matter.
I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is
the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which
seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or
Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use
here becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is
conscious if there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make
it so. We can always reify some "mystery" to block an application of a
theory to reality.
Bruno
Telmo.
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