On 11 May 2014 18:06, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 10 May 2014, at 13:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark >>>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if >>>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a >>>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness >>>>> will be computable by definition. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>> >>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>> obvious? >>> >> > You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations > generates consciousness. That is what I understand "consciousness is > computable" to mean. > > >> >> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >> trivial to disprove: >> >> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >> >> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >> > > Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to prove > > >> 2. brain generates consciousness but >> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >> > > No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that we > are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will fire > and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. > > >> so comp = ~comp >> >> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >> > > A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real > thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer > model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but > will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. > > > > Someone like Peter Jones would say that a simulation of a thunderstorm > cannot make you wet, but he would still agree that a simulation *in the > physical reality* of a couple "thunderstorm+observers", at some right > level, will make the observer feeling (conscious) of wetness. >
Yes, but that requires a further argument to show that the simulation can generate consciousness. Some, like Craig Weinberg on this list, use the fact that a simulation of a thunderstorm is not wet to claim that, analogously, a simulation of a brain is not consciousness. But that is not a valid argument. He would still be under the FPI if the physical universe is big and run a > UD, but he would not mean for him that is is under the purely arithmetical > FPI, so that he can save physicalism by supposing that the physical > universe is too small to run any significant part of the UD. But then the > MGA, or Maudlin's like argument, shows that consciousness use some magic > put in that primitive matter, having no other role to make it existing > physically to be lived from inside. They don't use the behavioral role of > that primitive matter, only the fact that it is primitive, and such move is > weak, and shown weaker through MGA. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
