On 25 June 2014 23:58, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > As a matter of sociology, you may well be right. But that apart, why > wouldn't such putative 3p "conscious processes" be as vulnerable to > elimination (i.e. reducible without loss to some putative ur-physical basis) > as temperature, computation, or any other physically-composite phenomenon? > > You mean reducible in explanation, but not eliminable in fact.
No, I mean the precise opposite: eliminable in fact, but not in explanation. > Temperature > is explained by kinetic energy of molecules, but you can't eliminate > temperature and keep kinetic energy of molecules. There's a difference > between eliminating in an explanation or description and eliminating in > fact. There is indeed. But as you yourself say below, we do suppose that all 3p describable phenomena can be reduced and hence that any intermediate level in the hierarchy of reduction IS eliminable (i.e. surplus to requirements) *in fact*. Such intermediate levels (be they in terms of temperature or kinetic energy of molecules) are by contrast NOT eliminable from our explanations, simply because we lack the capability to follow through any "explanation" at the fully-reduced level. > The principal assumption then is that all phenomena whatsoever can be > reduced without loss to some "primitive" (i.e. assumptively irreducible) > basis, in which process the higher levels are effectively eliminated. > > Or that all 3p describable phenomena can be reduced. Which is what I > suppose. There may remain 1p phenomena (qualia?) which are not explicitly > part of the reductive description, but which we suppose are still there > because of the similarity of the 3p part to our 3p part which is > consistently correlated with our 1p part (i.e. the reason we don't believe > in p-zombies). But "our" 3p part turns out to be one of the convenient "epistemological fictions" that we have (inconveniently) eliminated *in fact*. This is no kind of a problem for a purely 3p reduction, in terms of which which all such intermediate levels are in the end fictional, but every kind of a problem for the remaining 1p part, which it is (to say the least) inconvenient to consider such a fiction. > Equivalently, one might say it's bottom-up all the way down. As an analogy, > in the human sphere, this would be the contention that all political or > sociological phenomena whatsoever can be reduced without loss > > I think "without loss" is ambiguous. It could mean that in a simulation of > the phenomena we would not have to consider it (because it would arise from > the lower level, e.g. markets) or it could mean that it wouldn't occur. No, it just means that if you assembled all the relevant human players in the appropriate relations you would ex hypothesi have reproduced the higher-level phenomena. Hence the inverse "reduction" from the sociological to the human can be accomplished unambiguously "without loss". It really is a case of bottom-up all the way down. David > On 6/25/2014 3:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 25 June 2014 22:01, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> Note that I have not argued that the ability to 3p engineer consciousness >> will do anything to explain or diminish 1p conscious experience. I just >> predict it will become a peripheral fact that consciousness of kind x goes >> with physical processes or computations of type y. > > > As a matter of sociology, you may well be right. But that apart, why > wouldn't such putative 3p "conscious processes" be as vulnerable to > elimination (i.e. reducible without loss to some putative ur-physical basis) > as temperature, computation, or any other physically-composite phenomenon? > > > You mean reducible in explanation, but not eliminable in fact. Temperature > is explained by kinetic energy of molecules, but you can't eliminate > temperature and keep kinetic energy of molecules. There's a difference > between eliminating in an explanation or description and eliminating in > fact. > > And, should they indeed be eliminable in this way, what does that bode for > any 1p accompaniments? Note, please, that I am not staking any personal > belief on the reductive assumptions as stated; I'm merely attempting to > articulate them somewhat explicitly in order to discern what might, and what > might not, be legitimately derivable from them. > > The principal assumption then is that all phenomena whatsoever can be > reduced without loss to some "primitive" (i.e. assumptively irreducible) > basis, in which process the higher levels are effectively eliminated. > > > Or that all 3p describable phenomena can be reduced. Which is what I > suppose. There may remain 1p phenomena (qualia?) which are not explicitly > part of the reductive description, but which we suppose are still there > because of the similarity of the 3p part to our 3p part which is > consistently correlated with our 1p part (i.e. the reason we don't believe > in p-zombies). > > > Equivalently, one might say it's bottom-up all the way down. As an analogy, > in the human sphere, this would be the contention that all political or > sociological phenomena whatsoever can be reduced without loss > > > I think "without loss" is ambiguous. It could mean that in a simulation of > the phenomena we would not have to consider it (because it would arise from > the lower level, e.g. markets) or it could mean that it wouldn't occur. > > Brent > > > to the behaviour and relations of individual human beings (i.e. what > Margaret Thatcher presumably intended by "there's no such thing as > society"). > > David > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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