On 29 Jul 2014, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 July 2014 19:16, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
This makes clearer my "apprehension" of Hoyle's heuristic, which
might, if taken too much seriously, be on the slope of a
reductionism of something 1p to something 3p. Perhaps.
I do appreciate the picture and your attempt to use it for helping
people to better handle the CTM.
Well, I trust I've never taken it more seriously than as a possibly
helpful metaphor (in the spirit of Wittgensteins's ladders). But
Hoyle's idea seems intrinsically 1p to me. It doesn't seem to depend
on any 3p ontological assumption in particular. His universal knower
possesses at the outset a panoptic overview that is conceived as
continually splitting into discrete momentarily-relativised
episodes. ISTM that according to Hoyle, in terms of each such
episode (or consistent subjective extension)
OK, that was not always clear. But it leads to the difficult, if any,
question of the relation between machines and truth.
With comp, the "consistent" extension are really relative to the
"actual state of mind", but the relation between God, be it the outer
and the inner one" might be of a different type. God is not subject to
the indeterminacy a priori, It needs to lose itself somehow and that's
what brain does and universal number's do by particularizing the
universal consciousness in contexts.
we should expect to find ourselves in precisely the state of
relative existential indeterminacy you describe.
Always? In all mind state?
Those are very complex questions, and I have to say that the
exploration of "radically different" altered consciousness state have
made the task more complex.
I suppose the question is whether any immediate experience can
plausibly be correlated with *some* discrete 3p configuration (even
in the case that this may be any one of a fungible class), like a
"time capsule". Perhaps this notion is itself incompatible with
comp? Perhaps you could you elucidate further.
MGA questions the link between "consciousness here and now" with "my
brain/body here and now".
It is more like: "consciousness here and now" is linked to the whole
diabolo of possible "past computations" + "possible future
computations/consistent extensions". That link is not an
identification, as the 1p is not any 3p thing, but a modal view, which
enforces the semantical structures on the consistent extensions (the
<>p, which behaves differently according to the points of view chosen
among the eight basic provided by incompleteness).
A computational state makes sense only relatively to universal
numbers, which themselves makes sense through the sigma-1 complete
assumption we make, but consciousness mix truth (God) with the
"histories", made by all universal numbers,
The notion of 'time capsule' (Barbour) is a priori a good pedagogical
tool, it corresponds to the 1p Maury effect, where the brain create in
a short period of time a complete (new) 1p-past, like in the beginning
of dreams, and in the beginning of many novels. The brain does that
indeed all the time, in some sense. But the consciousness is not
related to a 3p time capsule, but to that 3p structure *and* its
relation with the arithmetical truth, which is more than just the 3p
diabolo. We can't know from inside what it is exactly, at least in the
non dissociative mundane experience of "the time capsule".
Advanced stuff, David. I have not the competence to translate such
nuance in arithmetic. It touch many open problems. It needs probably
the full quantified modal logics, and a better understanding of the
relation between consciousness and each hypostase.
It is the frustrating aspect of computationalism. The interesting
questions become difficult problems in arithmetic and metamathematics/
computer science.
Bruno
David
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