On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
>>>         copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong
>>>         in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the
>>>         origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
>>>         original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a
>>>         bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy
>>>         was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy
>>>         would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy
>>>         was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer
>>>         until the 0.1% copy was revived.
>>>
>>>     How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a
>>>     tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new
>>>     persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the
>>>     level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we
>>>  cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
>>>     restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big
>>>     toe is not a relevant difference.
>>>
>>> It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and
>>> better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved.
>>>
>>
>> What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost instantaneously,
>> so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios. If they
>> are made to be different by the machine, then there is no duplication!
>
>
>  I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life,
> but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because
> I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me;
> yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that
> hadn't grown was made somewhere else.
>
>
> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the
> closest continuation.
>

What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another location
and the copy moved to the original's bed?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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