Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

                The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
                copies consider themselves to be the original - both are
        wrong
                in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the
                origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
                original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit
        taller and a
                bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if
        one copy
                was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy
                would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1%
        copy
                was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the
        continuer
                until the 0.1% copy was revived.

            How are you going to measure these fine differences? If
        there is a
            tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are
        two new
            persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate
        at the
            level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact --
        we     cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
            restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in
        your big
            toe is not a relevant difference.

        It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller
        and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC,
        but improved.

    What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
    instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in
    these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine,
    then there is no duplication!

I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else.

You forget the closest continuer theory of personal identity. It is only when there are ties, as in duplication, that there is a problem of personal identity. And this problem is resolved by stating that there are two new people in such cases.

Why do you find this difficult?

Bruce

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