On 22 Jun 2015, at 14:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Jun 2015, at 09:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
John Clark wrote:
After they diverge they will still both identify with
the same
person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will
identify
with
each other, and both would consider their life to
be more
important than that other fellow who happened to have
the same
name. Before they diverged things would be very
different, there
would be no other fellow, there would only be one.
That is an eminently sensible statement. It accords well
with the
"closest continuer" theory of personal identity.
According
to that
theory, if there is a tie for being the *closest*
continuer,
as in
this case, the initial person does not continue, but
two new
persons
are created. If the duplicate is identical to the
original
in every
respect, there is only one person -- identity of
indiscernibles and
all that. JC is correct, there would be no 'other
fellow'.
Once the copy diverges from the original, there are two
different
(new) persons. They may share some memories, but so
what? People
often share memories. Neither is the original person.
The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
copies consider themselves to be the original - both are
wrong
in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the
origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller
and a
bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one
copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy
would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy
was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the
continuer
until the 0.1% copy was revived.
How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there
is a
tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are
two new
persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at
the
level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact --
we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your
big
toe is not a relevant difference.
It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller
and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC,
but improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons
in these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the
machine, then there is no duplication!
Then there is new person all the time, and no more any prediction
could be done or related to the world.
You have overlooked the context of this conversation, as has
Stathis. My starting point was the closest continuer account of
personal identity.
OK. But here, you are invoking a non computable process relevant for
the mind, that is non-comp.
We might ask you what is the role of that non Turing element, and
which is it?
There is no problem in this account with the day-to-day changes in
every person. There are problems only in these duplication cases.
The simplest resolution in that situation is that there is no
closest continuer, so two new persons are created. This is
especially evident when the copying of the original is destructive.
You stop at step zero. Non comp.
That is not a reason to be negative on comp, or the CTM theory of
mind. I study only the consequence of comp, with mind defined in
arithmetic by what the universal numbers do.
You dismiss computer science, which obviously is a key to progress
from comp.
"My theory" is not my theory. It is not Gödel, nor Löb, nor Solovay's
theory. It is the theory of any classical universal numbers looking
inward enough.
RA cannot do that, but RA gives already the universal dovetailing,
universality, sigma_1 completeness.
But PA, ZF, can do that.
It is math.
But we have agreed to link the person identity used for personal
prediction to the one having the relevant memory,
As I have said before, this is your account of personal identity.
And it is self-serving -- designed to give the answer you want.
It helps to get the point in UDA, and it is defined mathematically by
the Dxy = T(xxy) diagonal method, a quite standard mathematics in
computer science.
You ignore all the problems associated with personal memory and
personal recollections of past happenings. There are enough people
who think they are Napoleon, or the reincarnation of Alexander the
Great, to throw your theory into disrepair.
I use no more than I need in the reasoning, giving axiomatics of all
relevant notions.
Also, I have personal experience of a person with brain damage who
has great difficulties with remembering things. And frequently this
problem manifests itself in the form of false memories -- the person
is convinced that something or the other happened, or that they did
something, when I know quite well, and can demonstrate by external
evidence, that these 'memories' are false -- confabulations, indeed.
First person accounts of anything are inherently unreliable and must
be checked against external objective (interpersonal agreed)
evidence. You build you theory on very shaky grounds.
What?
"My theory" assumes only elementary arithmetic, and the bet on comp.
You are the one speculating on a non computable physical process and a
mysterious link with consciousness.
which exist by the existence of the duplication level (assumed in
mechanism). In step 7, we don't need multiple copies, as the many
"preparation" in arithmetic are enough to get the global FPI (we
assume comp).
You argue against comp, but Joihn Clark assumes comp (and accept
steps 0, 1, and 2).
You keep asking for evidence against comp. I continue to provide it,
but you just ignore any contrary accounts.
Where did I have asked for any evidence for comp? I provide only a
technic to test it.
You don't have given any evidence for non-comp. I know only the
collapse for being an apparent evidence, but that is considered as an
"hallucination" by most on this list.
There is no problem with non-comp philosophy.
There is only problem for those wanting both computationalism and
primary matter (which is weird as comp provides a theory of primary
matter)
The universal numbers are telling us something, and now we can test it.
I am more conservative than you. I do not speculate on a primary
physical universe. Just to address the mind-body problem, I think that
we have to be cautious and avoid any implicit ontological commitments.
I just listen to the numbers who listen to themselves.
Are you really dogmatic on physicalism?
I think that with computationalism, and many of its weakening, the
physical, that is the core observable is a modality of universal
machine self-apprehension, where consciousness is a self selector.
Our type of human consciousness might still need more than the core
linearity, but also long and deep histories/mythologies from Adam to
Big Bangs and beyond.
Normally that naive classical first interview should be quickly
refuted, but that is not easy to show either.
The least I illustrate is some hard "matter problem" for the
computationalist, but the physics from intuitive comp (UDA, all
computations) and formal (AUDA, machine self-reference) invites to the
idea that the empiric "quantum" might be a symptom of the way the
digital see when seen from inside by itself.
If this works, physics get real solid ground, as the border of a
mathematical deformation, in part entailed by the universal machine
looking inward.
The universal machine looking inward cannot miss the difference
between []p and []p & p, and can justify relations between them.
You are the one assuming an unproven object to avoid looking at some
consequences based on assuming less.
Bruno
Bruce
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