meekerdb wrote:
On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary
life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up
tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I
would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest
continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't
grown was made somewhere else.
I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against
being the closest continuation.
What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another
location and the copy moved to the original's bed?
That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that
asleep=mindless. Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both
the original and the copy find himself in a disjoint location
incompatible with where he was before?
I think part of the problem here is that the first-person impression is
taken to be definitive. Since the closest continuer theory weights
bodily continuity fairly highly in the metric whereby 'closest' is to be
determined, what happens to your body, whether or not you are conscious
of it, is an important consideration. Similarly, physical causal
connections weight significantly. Consequently, moving while asleep or
anaesthetized are scarcely relevant to the personal identity issue.
Bruce
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