On 6/22/2015 5:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary
life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up
tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I
would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest
continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't
grown was made somewhere else.
I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against
being the closest continuation.
What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another location and the copy
moved to the original's bed?
That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that asleep=mindless. Anesthetic
would make a better example. But won't both the original and the copy find himself in a
disjoint location incompatible with where he was before?
I think part of the problem here is that the first-person impression is taken to be
definitive. Since the closest continuer theory weights bodily continuity fairly highly
in the metric whereby 'closest' is to be determined, what happens to your body, whether
or not you are conscious of it, is an important consideration.
It was my understanding that closest continuer was to be judged entirely in terms of
conscious thoughts, e.g. memories. Of course these include memories of ones body so
noticeable physical changes would count against, but discontinuity that was not noticeable
wouldn't. Causal connection doesn't count because the idea is to explain everything,
including causality in terms of consciousness. I'm not even sure the theory is coherent.
I want to ask; continuer of what? It seems to intuitively rest on the idea a being or
soul that *must* continue and so must attach to some best vehicle.
But maybe Stathis should explain what he means by the theory.
Brent
Similarly, physical causal connections weight significantly. Consequently, moving while
asleep or anaesthetized are scarcely relevant to the personal identity issue.
Bruce
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