This is covered also in Martine Rothblatt's mind clone conjecture. Conceivably, let us say in an upload to 3 different VR environments, in which the uploadee provides the avatars for these 3 places, dies in the process, who is the closest continuer? To start, they all are, moreover, if they are able to visit one another in their various terrariums, they can discuss the matter with each other. So upon dying in the process, the Uploadee, will leave his 3 clones with memories of their own deaths, and their subsequent awakenings in their new VR terrariums. Unless one is fighting over a fortune that is left behind in meat space, then this is just sqabbling about a lawsuit and control over money. Did the Uploadee survive his own death? Yes, as a closest continuer, all three of them. How about a million? Yes, again. But that is kind of narcissistic, don't you think?
Sent from AOL Mobile Mail -----Original Message----- From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Mon, Jun 22, 2015 03:01 PM Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark <div id="AOLMsgPart_2_f45c9cd0-2fdb-4c1f-a402-86d176de3ef2"> On Monday, June 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett < <a target="_blank" href="mailto:[email protected]";>[email protected]</a>> wrote: <blockquote class="aolmail_gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: <blockquote class="aolmail_gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett < <a>[email protected]</a> <mailto: <a>[email protected]</a>>> wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer until the 0.1% copy was revived. How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big toe is not a relevant difference. It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved. What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then there is no duplication! I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else. </blockquote> You forget the closest continuer theory of personal identity. It is only when there are ties, as in duplication, that there is a problem of personal identity. And this problem is resolved by stating that there are two new people in such cases. Why do you find this difficult? </blockquote> In the example I gave there is no tie. I wake up taller, I am the closest continuer, so I am me; someone else is created who is the same height, the taller version is no longer closest continuer. <span></span> -- Stathis Papaioannou <p></p> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to <a target="_blank" href="mailto:[email protected]";>[email protected]</a>. To post to this group, send email to <a target="_blank" href="mailto:[email protected]";>[email protected]</a>. Visit this group at <a target="_blank" href="http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list";>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list</a>. For more options, visit <a target="_blank" href="https://groups.google.com/d/optout";>https://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>. </div> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
