Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, June 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:Stathis Papaioannou wrote:I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else. You forget the closest continuer theory of personal identity. It is only when there are ties, as in duplication, that there is a problem of personal identity. And this problem is resolved by stating that there are two new people in such cases. Why do you find this difficult?In the example I gave there is no tie. I wake up taller, I am the closest continuer, so I am me; someone else is created who is the same height, the taller version is no longer closest continuer.
You have made a copy at some time, then the copies diverged. They are different persons at that point. The closest continuer theory requires a lot more than that some random person somewhere might be like I was a while ago so that person becomes me. Bodily continuity plays an important role, as does physical and mental causality. Your scenario is not a refutation of the theory -- there is no ambiguity here as to who is the closest continuer.
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