On Monday, June 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both >> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are >> wrong >> in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the >> origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the >> original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit >> taller and a >> bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if >> one copy >> was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% >> copy >> would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% >> copy >> was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the >> continuer >> until the 0.1% copy was revived. >> >> How are you going to measure these fine differences? If >> there is a >> tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are >> two new >> persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate >> at the >> level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- >> we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning >> restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in >> your big >> toe is not a relevant difference. >> >> It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller >> and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, >> but improved. >> >> What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost >> instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in >> these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, >> then there is no duplication! >> >> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, >> but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because >> I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; >> yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that >> hadn't grown was made somewhere else. >> > > You forget the closest continuer theory of personal identity. It is only > when there are ties, as in duplication, that there is a problem of personal > identity. And this problem is resolved by stating that there are two new > people in such cases. > > Why do you find this difficult? > In the example I gave there is no tie. I wake up taller, I am the closest continuer, so I am me; someone else is created who is the same height, the taller version is no longer closest continuer. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
