On Jul 6, 2015 1:19 PM, "John Clark" <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> >> >>> I think this is the key point. In Many Worlds both before and after the split it's perfectly clear to both the subject of the experiment and to third party observers exactly who the experimental subject is because the laws of physics demand that there is only one thing that fits the description that anyone can see. On the other hand with duplicating chambers the laws of physics make no such demand. It's clear before the machine is turned on who the experimental subject is, but after it's turned on it wouldn't even be clear to the Moscow Man or the Washington Man who the experimental subject is, at least not unless emotion replaced their reason and both started chanting "it's me not him" for no logical reason. And if there is no way for ANYONE (not the first person, not the third person, not anyone) to identify the experimental subject then there is no way to know if any prediction made before the duplication was correct or not. >> >> >> > >> To the experiencer, it always feels like there is only one > > > Yes certainly, but after the machine is turned on who is the experiencer, the guy in Moscow or the guy in Washington? >
It doesn't matter to anyone who isn't Moscow man or Washington man. And both would say "I am the experiencer." > Nobody can give a single answer to that question, and I do mean nobody. > Wrong, Moscow man and Washington man can both give a single answer: "me". >>> >>> And I want to emphasis again that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have nothing to do with a sense of continuity and personal identity which was what Bruno was trying to explain. And the one great virtue that Many Worlds has that most other quantum interpretations do not is that Everett doesn't need to explain what a observer is or how consciousness works because those things have nothing to do with it. Yes when a brain changes the universe splits but that doesn't imply there is something special about brains, the universe splits when ANYTHING changes. >> >> >> > >> Nothing you said here differentiates the many worlds experiment from the duplicator experiment. > > > In one world the Helsinki Man flips a coin, it comes up heads so he takes a jet to Moscow, in another world > the Helsinki Man flips a coin, it > comes > up > tails > so he takes a jet to > Washington; in both cases the very laws of physics demand that NOBODY, not even the Helsinki Man himself, can observe more than one chunk of matter that behaves in a > Helsinki > m > an > ish way. > > But if duplicating machines exist then those same laws of physics allow ANYBODY, even the Helsinki Man himself, to observe many chunks of matter > that behave in a > Helsinki > m > an > ish way. But they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged. Now the laws of physics DEMAND that there be exactly one thing we can refer to as Moscow man and one thing we can refer to as Washington man. Just like many worlds! > > And if the very laws of physics can make the distinction that's about as fundamental a distinction as you can get. > >> > >> The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. After the split, who is the experiencer? > > > The experiencer is the one and only chunk of matter > that the laws of physics allow me or ANYONE to observe that behaves in a > Helsinki > m > an > ish way. How cold anything be more unambiguous that that? > It couldn't. Ditto for Moscow mannish chunks of matter and Washington mannish chunks of matter. Terren >> > >> The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. >> If it's a scientific experiment then afterwards its important for somebody to point to "THE" >> conscious experience >> r >> , but nobody can do that with just one finger. > > > Nobody can do that? I'm somebody and I can do that. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email [email protected]. > Visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visithttps://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
