On Sun, Jul 5, 2015 at 4:47 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >1. >> You assume computationalism, or the idea that consciousness supervenes on >> the physical brain. >> > > Yes, and can anybody logically dispute my claim? A change in the physical > brain ALWAYS causes a change in consciousness. And a change in > consciousness is ALWAYS associated with a change in the physical brain. > What more proof is necessary? What more proof is even possible? > Just making things explicit, including the assumption of computationalism. > > >> > 2. >> Starting with a Many Worlds thought experiment (such as Schrodinger's >> Cat), there is one conscious subject supervening on one conscious brain >> prior to the duplication. >> > > To avoid confusion when dealing with Many Worlds I will call it a split, > and when dealing with copying machines I will will call it a duplication, > but basically I agree with the above. > > > >> > 3. >> After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge >> as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment >> > > If they observe different things after leaving the duplicating chamber > then their brains will no longer be identical, and as a consequence neither > will their consciousness. > > > >> > 4. >> Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical >> brains. >> > > Not necessarily, it's not clear if you're talking about Many Worlds or > not. With duplication chambers the two physical brains could still be > identical and thus produce two identical consciousnesses. And two > identical consciousnesses > > are exactly the same as one consciousness. With Many Worlds if things > remain physically identical then nothing splits. > >From #2 to #5 I was talking Many Worlds, then comparing the duplication machine in #6 to #9 (odd the numbers got messed up in the reply - probably shouldn't use gmail's numbered bullet lists) > > >> > 5. >> You accept the idea that in a Many Worlds experiment like the above, the >> subject is duplicated, and prior to the experiment, the subject can >> sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced >> post-duplication. >> > > I think this is the key point. In Many Worlds both before and after the > split it's perfectly clear to both the subject of the experiment and to > third party observers exactly who the experimental subject is because the > laws of physics demand that there is only one thing that fits the > description that anyone can see. On the other hand with duplicating > chambers the laws of physics make no such demand. It's clear before the > machine is turned on who the experimental subject is, but after it's turned > on it wouldn't even be clear to the Moscow Man or the Washington Man who > the experimental subject is, at least not unless emotion replaced their > reason and both started chanting "it's me not him" for no logical reason. > And if there is no way for ANYONE (not the first person, not the third > person, not anyone) to identify the experimental subject then there is no > way to know if any prediction made before the duplication was correct or > not. > > To the experiencer, it always feels like there is only one, as there is only one brain upon which a consciousness supervenes, by definition of supervenience. Moscow Man would feel to be the only one, as would Washington man. They have different brains/consciousnesses, as you accepted, and knowledge of the other is not important. For instance, each would have no idea whether the other survived, upon emerging from the machine. Or, anticipating step 4, one of the duplications could be delayed for an arbitrarily long time, so in that case, the outcome of the duplication might not even be knowable in principle by the first copy. Or the duplication process could cause amnesia and each copy would have forgotten they were duplicated, waking up in a strange city. What they know or don't know about the other doesn't change the fact that each feels to be a continuation of Helsinki Man, yet still unique. And each unique experiencer is experiencing one of multiple outcomes that were anticipated prior to the duplication, just as in Many Worlds. > And I want to emphasis again that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have > nothing to do with a sense of continuity and personal identity which was > what Bruno was trying to explain. And the one great virtue that Many Worlds > has that most other quantum interpretations do not is that Everett doesn't > need to explain what a observer is or how consciousness works because those > things have nothing to do with it. Yes when a brain changes the universe > splits but that doesn't imply there is something special about brains, the > universe splits when ANYTHING changes. > Nothing you said here differentiates the many worlds experiment from the duplicator experiment. In both, predictions are made; and in neither is it important to explain what an observer is or how consciousness works, beyond the assumption of computationalism. > > >> > 5. >> Moving on to a duplication machine experiment, such as the one postulated >> in Bruno's step 3, there is one conscious subject supervening on one >> conscious brain prior to the duplication (identical to #2 above) >> > > OK. > > > >> > 6. >> After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge >> as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment >> > > Yes, the two physical brains encounter different environments, when that > happens the 2 identical brains are no longer identical anymore and so > neither is the consciousness they produce. > > > >> > 7. >> Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical >> brains. >> > > OK. > > > >> > 8. >> Therefore, as in #5 above, prior to the experiment the subject can >> sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced >> post-duplication. >> > > No, not as in #5 above! After the duplication machine is turned on there > is no way for anyone, and I do mean ANYONE, to know who "the subject" is. > After duplication who is the experiencer? There is more than one answer to > that question and that shouldn't be surprising because the experiencer has > been duplicated. That's what the word "duplicated" means. > The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. After the split, who is the experiencer? There is more than one answer to that question and that shouldn't be surprising because the experiencer has been split. That's what the word "split" means. > > >> >> > >> The only thing that is needed to make Step 3 go through is a conscious >> experiencer pre-duplication, and a split into two bodies post-duplication. >> It is *not* important whether anyone observing this experiment can make >> sense of the identity of the bodies. >> > > That is incorrect. If it's a scientific experiment then afterwards its > important for somebody to point to "THE" > conscious experience > r > , but nobody can do that with just one finger, not even the > > conscious experience > rs can do that. > > The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. If it's a scientific experiment then afterwards its important for somebody to point to "THE" conscious experience r , but nobody can do that with just one finger. As above, the conscious experiencers would point to themselves (as they would in Many Worlds). Terren > John K Clark > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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