On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> I think this is the key point. In Many Worlds both before and after the >> split it's perfectly clear to both the subject of the experiment and to >> third party observers exactly who the experimental subject is because the >> laws of physics demand that there is only one thing that fits the >> description that anyone can see. On the other hand with duplicating >> chambers the laws of physics make no such demand. It's clear before the >> machine is turned on who the experimental subject is, but after it's turned >> on it wouldn't even be clear to the Moscow Man or the Washington Man who >> the experimental subject is, at least not unless emotion replaced their >> reason and both started chanting "it's me not him" for no logical reason. >> And if there is no way for ANYONE (not the first person, not the third >> person, not anyone) to identify the experimental subject then there is no >> way to know if any prediction made before the duplication was correct or >> not. >> > > > > To the experiencer, it always feels like there is only one >
Yes certainly, but after the machine is turned on who is the experiencer, the guy in Moscow or the guy in Washington? Nobody can give a single answer to that question, and I do mean nobody. > And I want to emphasis again that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have >> nothing to do with a sense of continuity and personal identity which was >> what Bruno was trying to explain. And the one great virtue that Many Worlds >> has that most other quantum interpretations do not is that Everett doesn't >> need to explain what a observer is or how consciousness works because those >> things have nothing to do with it. Yes when a brain changes the universe >> splits but that doesn't imply there is something special about brains, the >> universe splits when ANYTHING changes. >> > > > > Nothing you said here differentiates the many worlds experiment from the > duplicator experiment. > In one world the Helsinki Man flips a coin, it comes up heads so he takes a jet to Moscow, in another world the Helsinki Man flips a coin, it comes up tails so he takes a jet to Washington; in both cases the very laws of physics demand that NOBODY, not even the Helsinki Man himself, can observe more than one chunk of matter that behaves in a Helsinki m an ish way. But if duplicating machines exist then those same laws of physics allow ANYBODY, even the Helsinki Man himself, to observe many chunks of matter that behave in a Helsinki m an ish way. And if the very laws of physics can make the distinction that's about as fundamental a distinction as you can get. > > The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. After the split, who > is the experiencer? > The experiencer is the one and only chunk of matter that the laws of physics allow me or ANYONE to observe that behaves in a Helsinki m an ish way. How cold anything be more unambiguous that that? > > The same "objection" can be raised about Many Worlds. > If it's a scientific experiment then afterwards its important for somebody > to point to "THE" > conscious experience > r > , but nobody can do that with just one finger. > Nobody can do that? I'm somebody and I can do that. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
