On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 11:39:47 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Pierz <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > >> > >> if the quantum state evolves deterministically > > > The wave function most certainly evolves deterministically but that's > not important because the wave function is not observable, I want to know > if the actual physical state evolves deterministically. The answer is far > from obvious. If everything that can happen does happen then did anything > determine one particular branch of the multiverse? >
My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion, to use Bruno's detested terminology. I don't understand your last sentence/question. The laws of the physics determined every branch, and none of them are privileged in any way. > > > >> > >> where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's >> answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer >> ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he >> understands. > > > Of course I understands that! > I know you do - because who could fail to understand it? > If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, > but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of > both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think > he has. > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. i.e., the duplication or branching of an observer leads to the appearance of randomness from the perspective of that observer, even though the objective situation contains no indeterminacy. If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic of FPI, which is entirely abstractable from the context in which it occurs. If you can see how indeterminacy works *logically* in MWI, you have agreed with the *logic* of step 3. If that is not the case, you need to explain how the situations are logically different, because AFAICT the only difference between the two cases is the nature of the duplicator. Perhaps you can explain why it matters whether the duplicator is the multiverse or a teleportation device? > I think he's just rehashing the sort indeterminacy first discovered about > 90 years ago. > > OK, so Bruno is an upstart! A pompous ass! An incompetent fewl! And what's worse, these dorks on the Everything List treat his damnfool ideas with respect, stroke his bloated ego and foster his pretensions to genius! Let's face it, that's what gets your goat and why you will never in a million years admit that step 3 is valid even though you admit to the validity of Everett's identical logic. > > >> Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno? > > > Clearly a troll, Bruno and you are so brilliant nobody could really > disagree, they can only pretend to disagree for some obscure but > undoubtedly sinister reason. > The motivations of trolls are not obscure and yours are no exception. > > John K Clark > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
