On 06 Aug 2017, at 22:41, John Clark wrote:
> The rat thinks, "I will get a reward if I go through this
door". The copies of the rat think, "great, I got the reward", or
"no reward, I'm disappointed,
Yes, the 2 copies saw different things when they opened their
duplicating chamber doors and so formed different memories and so
will no longer be identical copies
and so had different conscious experiences, assuming rats have
conscious experiences . In other words different things will have
different conscious experiences. But where is the great mystery in
that? Where is the indeterminacy?
If there is no indeterminacy, what is the bet in Helsinki?
> Yes. Only the actual private consciousness decides, the first
person,
Which "THE first person" decides what the Helsinki man
should have been told yesterday about what he was going to see
today, the one in Washington or the one in Moscow?
BOTH. You keep coming back on this question again!!!!
THE result that the H-man obtained in W is W.
THE result that the H-man obtained in M is M.
And none of them were able to predict THE result that each of them
got, from they first person pov, on which the question in Helsinki was
all about.
Let me ask a very important question that may clear this up. Are
the following 2 questions equivalent?
1) What will I see tomorrow?
2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now
see?
If you think they are equivalent and if tomorrow 2 people remember
being you today then it would be ridiculous to expect only one
answer is correct just as it would be silly to expect that the
equation X^2 =4 only has one solution.
If you think they are not equivalent then please explain what the
word "I" in the question means extrapolated into the future.
> The guy opens the door, and sees that he is in Washington
(resp. Moscow). He expected to be in a city asking that very
question ..., and now, thanks to the miraculous mechanist
resurrection, he feels it
So what he expected to happen did happen. So where is the
indeterminacy?
P(finding oneself in one city) = 1, and that happened. But now, both
copies knows precisely which city they see, and *that* was not
predictable.
Glad you agree P(finding oneself in one city) = 1. So you know that
from your future first person view you will find yourself in once
city, but you cannot be sure which one it will be.
> "Why am I the one in Washington (resp. Moscow)?".
I don't understand the question. The one and only thing that can
turn the Helsinki man into the Washington man is the sight of
Washington. Nothing else will do. And the pronoun "I" in the above
refers to the Washington man.
OK. But we have agreed that both the W and M men are honorable
continuer of the H-man. (he did not die!).
So why was it that the Washington man was the one who saw
Washington? Because that's what "the Washington man" means. Becoming
the Washington man didn't cause you to see Washington,
?
seeing Washington caused you to become the Washington man.
OK.
Until somebody saw Washington there was no Washington man.
OK.
I don't know what else you want me to say. I don't know what you
want me to predict that I haven't already predicted.
?
What did you predict?
> We can prove: IF digital mechanism THEN there is that
unpredictability
Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked
to predict. Nobody knows what "it" is.
?
"it" refer to the city the candidate can expect to feel herself in
after pushing the button. In our protocol P(London) = P(Vienna) =
P(Bejing) = P(Sidney) = 0, but P(Washington) = P(Moscow) = 1/2.
P(W) is not equal to 1, because this is refuted by the M-man.
P(M) is not equal to 1, because this is refuted by the W-man.
P(W v M) = 1
P(W & M) = 0 (because W and M refer to the experience lived after the
button will be pressed, not the localization of (3p) body).
W and M are incompatible, so P(W v M) = 1 implies that P(W) + P(M) =
1, and that implies P(W) and P(M) least than 1, and equal for reason
of numerical identity. Sp P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.
Move to step 5, now. (you have agreed with step 4 (and implicitly step
3) in your other post).
Bruno
John K Clark
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