I think you have conflated Bruno's post and mine. On Mon, 7 Aug 2017 at 6:41 am, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >> The rat thinks, "I will get a reward if I go through this door". The >> copies of the rat think, "great, I got the reward", or "no reward, I'm >> disappointed, >> > > > Yes, the 2 copies saw different things when they opened their duplicating > chamber doors and so formed different memories and so will no longer be > identical copies > and so had different conscious experiences, assuming rats have conscious > experiences . In other words different things will have different > conscious experiences. But where is the great mystery in that? Where is the > indeterminacy? > > > > >> Yes. Only the actual private consciousness decides, the first person, >> > > Which "*THE* > first person > " > decides what the Helsinki man should have been told yesterday about what > he was going to see today, the one in Washington or the one in Moscow? > > Let me ask a very important question that may clear this up. Are the > following 2 questions equivalent? > > > 1) What will I see tomorrow? > 2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see? > > If you think they are equivalent and if tomorrow 2 people remember being > you today then it would be ridiculous to expect only one answer is correct > just as it would be silly to expect that the equation X^2 =4 only has one > solution. > > If you think they are not equivalent then please explain what the word "I" > in the question means extrapolated into the future. > > > >> The guy opens the door, and sees that he is in Washington (resp. Moscow). >> He expected to be in a city asking that very question ..., and now, thanks >> to the miraculous mechanist resurrection, he feels it >> > > So what he expected to happen did happen. So where is the indeterminacy? > > >> > >> "Why am I the one in Washington (resp. Moscow)?". >> > > I don't understand the question. The one and only thing that can turn the > Helsinki man into the Washington man is the sight of Washington. Nothing > else will do. And the pronoun "I" in the above refers to the Washington > man. So why was it > that the Washington man was the one who saw Washington? Because that's > what "the Washington man" means. Becoming the Washington man didn't cause > you to see Washington, seeing Washington caused you to become the > Washington man. > > Until somebody saw Washington there was no Washington man. > I don't know what else you want me to say. > > I don't know what you want me to predict that I haven't already predicted. > > > > >> We can prove: IF digital mechanism THEN there is that unpredictability >> > > Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked to > predict. Nobody knows what "it" is. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
