I think you have conflated Bruno's post and mine. On Mon, 7 Aug 2017 at 6:41 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >> The rat thinks, "I will get a reward if I go through this door". The >> copies of the rat think, "great, I got the reward", or "no reward, I'm >> disappointed, >> > > > Yes, the 2 copies saw different things when they opened their duplicating > chamber doors and so formed different memories and so will no longer be > identical copies > and so had different conscious experiences, assuming rats have conscious > experiences . In other words different things will have different > conscious experiences. But where is the great mystery in that? Where is the > indeterminacy? > > > > >> Yes. Only the actual private consciousness decides, the first person, >> > > Which "*THE* > first person > " > decides what the Helsinki man should have been told yesterday about what > he was going to see today, the one in Washington or the one in Moscow? > > Let me ask a very important question that may clear this up. Are the > following 2 questions equivalent? > > > 1) What will I see tomorrow? > 2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see? > > If you think they are equivalent and if tomorrow 2 people remember being > you today then it would be ridiculous to expect only one answer is correct > just as it would be silly to expect that the equation X^2 =4 only has one > solution. > > If you think they are not equivalent then please explain what the word "I" > in the question means extrapolated into the future. > > > >> The guy opens the door, and sees that he is in Washington (resp. Moscow). >> He expected to be in a city asking that very question ..., and now, thanks >> to the miraculous mechanist resurrection, he feels it >> > > So what he expected to happen did happen. So where is the indeterminacy? > > >> > >> "Why am I the one in Washington (resp. Moscow)?". >> > > I don't understand the question. The one and only thing that can turn the > Helsinki man into the Washington man is the sight of Washington. Nothing > else will do. And the pronoun "I" in the above refers to the Washington > man. So why was it > that the Washington man was the one who saw Washington? Because that's > what "the Washington man" means. Becoming the Washington man didn't cause > you to see Washington, seeing Washington caused you to become the > Washington man. > > Until somebody saw Washington there was no Washington man. > I don't know what else you want me to say. > > I don't know what you want me to predict that I haven't already predicted. > > > > >> We can prove: IF digital mechanism THEN there is that unpredictability >> > > Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked to > predict. Nobody knows what "it" is. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.