On 30 Sep 2017, at 22:48, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Sep 30, 2017 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
I predict the one and only one thing I will see tomorrow after I
become two is Santa Clause's workshop.
> Of course, this is a joke. I hope.
I was dead serious. After I have been duplicated and become two
there will be no proof that the one and only one thing that I
saw was Santa Clause's workshop but there will be no
proof that the one and only one thing that I saw was
NOT Santa Clause's workshop either; and the same thing could
be said for everything else in the universe.
?
And don't start talking about interviewing the copies afterwards
because they have nothing to do with it.
?
The question was asking about the one and only one being that will
result when one being becomes two, and neither the Moscow man nor
the Washington man fits that description better than a elf in Santa
Clause's workshop.
Ah OK. That is why you don't listen to the copies. They are elves in
Santa Clause's shop.
How could I have not figured that out earlier?
That's the trouble with gibberish statements, nothing can ever
confirm them and nothing can ever refute them.
You just illustrated this admirably.
>> Why is what you expect to see tomorrow more important
than what it turns out you actually see tomorrow?
> Because it is the relation between those two things which is
important,
Expectations that turn out to be correct are important and
valuable, expectations that turn out to be incorrect are the
opposite of that, and if a expectation turns out to be neither
correct nor incorrect then you were expecting gibberish.
Then all 1p talk is gibberish. The poor H-man and M-man have to be
considered like zombies or elves.
You are denying for all your copies to claim they have survived. That
looks like anti-computationalism for me. If you can't attribute them
genuine consciousness to the point of deciding not to read their
diaries, nor to even ask they what the feel and remember, why trust
the simple teleportation case?
You add some black magic in the duplication which by mechanism is just
not there.
> and not entirely obvious in a world with duplicating
machine. Without duplication, we can ascribe one's mind to the
body, but with the duplication, to evaluate what we can expect, such
simple identity link is no more available
Agreed.
OK.
>> An even more important question is "What one and only
one thing will "you" mean tomorrow if "you" is duplicated and
"you" becomes two today?"
>It means "W-man or M-man" in Helsinki.
Or? It's hard enough to predict what somebody will see
tomorrow, but if you can't even say who's future viewing you want
a prediction of then how am I suposed to do it?
I have a thought experiment of my own and this is the protocol:
1) I have TWO coins, a regular coin and a two headed coin.
2) I flip both coins.
3) Predict if the one and only coin will land heads or tails.
You can't predict it because of coin indeterminacy.
Hmm... let me think.
I think that I can't answer, because there is two coins landing on the
table, so that the question is meaningless.
Is it too early to start writing my Nobel Prize acceptance speech?
I am very honored that you think the first person indeterminacy
deserves the Nobel Prize, but the last Prize I got disappeared, and
the promotion which was promised got transformed into widening
defamation. So, well, no, thank you. I would get the Nobel Prize, even
the far away galaxies would believe that I am crackpot writing
gibberish.
Now, guess what is missing in your coin theorem? The coin 1p/3p
distinction. Normal, you ignore the question.
You don't refute step 3. You just stop ... because who care what the H-
guy could expect, his copies have nothing to say on the matter.
> There is no paradox. It is trivial that with comp,
You've been talking about "comp" for years but I still don't know
what that is so I have no opinion on the above.
Yes. I know. You have memory problem which is not helpful.
No problem: comp is my weak version of computationalism. It is the
Church-Turing thesis (CT) + what I sum up by "yes doctor" or even YD,
which is UDA step zero: the (theological) belief/assumption that we
can survive after a digital physical reincarnation, or physical re-
implementation. Comp = CT + YD. Write this on a post-it and put it on
your computer. I suggest.
> I can accept something like "death, or Saint-Peter, or Santa
Klaus" from an opponent to Mechanism. If you believe Mechanism is
false, you can in some sense expect anything.
Any expectation can happen if you can't say who the expectation
is about.
I can say it very well. You forget that you agreed that both are the
original guy. Everybody knows that guy very well, and after the
duplication, this will happen: for everybody's point of view, we can
find the guy in two different places simultaneously. But from the
personal view of both copies, they remember and live quite singular
event that they were unable to predict, and which the question was all
about.
> But from a computationalist it is pure nonsense, not even
laughable.
It makes no difference if computationalism is true or
false, if there is no question there can be no answer.
It is just because you deny the answer of the copies. You don't care
of the experience of the copies. I guess you see that it will lead to
the reduction of physics to machine's biology/psychology/theology.
> Please, you said that everything is predictable, so I ask you
to make that statement more clear and precise by telling what is it
that you write in the personal diary in Helsinki about what you
expect to live.
I've already told you that, after I have been duplicated and have
become TWO the ONE and only ONE place I expect to be is Santa
Clauses workshop, and that expectation will prove to be just as true
as any other.
Then you deny that you survive duplication. When the H-man and the M-
man will told us, "gosh, that damned crackpot was right, I see only
one city, simply. You already tell us to not listen to them!
> confused again the 1p view with the 3p view
Have you considered setting your mantra to music? It might make a
catchy song.
You are the one repeating the invalid step, which consists in ignoring
that the question concerns the first person experience, relatively to
a third person protocol.
In this post you get even more precise on this. You deliberately
ignores the copies' first person experiences, when the question asks
precisely that.
You don't refute step 3, you just say in a weird infinitely convoluted
way that you are not interested.
Step 4 is already much more interesting, as it asks if we should
change the expectations when introducing delays in the reconstitution
of the copies, on Mars and Europa (near Jupiter!) to avoid 3p local
clues.
Bruno
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