> On 11 Dec 2018, at 23:07, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 3:44:26 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> >> >> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>> >>> >>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is >>> primary. That is, that matter is not derivative from something more >>> fundamental. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal >>> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ >>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >>> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> ]) as providing a purely >>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then >>> why would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter >>> itself would seem to be superfluous. >>> >>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and >>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of >>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into >>> existence. >> >> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of >> matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is that consciousness of >> matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. So if the >> "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts >> about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets. Remember Bruno is a >> theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of God=arithmetic; and >> arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff. >> >> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper: >> >> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this >> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future >> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, >> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure >> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability >> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the >> corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights >> into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> >> >> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"? >> >> >> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as >> you see it evolve. >> >> What is its power supply? >> >> >> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of >> the physical laws of this universe. Even the laws of our universe permit >> the creation of computers which require no power to run. >> >> See the bit about reversible computing: >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle> (computations that >> are reversible require no energy). > > And they produce no results since they run both ways. They are not even > computations in the CT sense. > > I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing machines: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility> > > Jason > > > > > "Reversible computing is a form of unconventional computing > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing>.”
OK, so you agree that some, at least, “unconventional computing” does not require violation of CT. Good. Bruno > > > :) > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
