On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say
>> that science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific
>> languages - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology,
>> cellular biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology, ,…
>>
>>
>> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related,
>> like chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with
>> electron playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will
>> develop higher level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics.
>> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing
>> any language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*),
>> which should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality
>> is phi_i independent.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical
> language "dialects", like "Lagrangian":
>
> *This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like*
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the
> state of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the
> system can maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the
> easiest and most compact ways of presenting the theory.”
>
>
> That is technical language. It is just natural language with some
> technical terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of
> information, but it is open if the setting is classical or quantum, which
> changes a lot the interpretation problem.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> Suppose there is a conference *Languages for the Mind-Body Problem*,
> including
>
> G*
> EMPL⁺
>
>
>
> G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical
> ontological (Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity
> axioms, or super-Turing elements).
>
>
>
>
> The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages
> which could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages.
>
> ⁺ *Experiential Modalities Programing Language*
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
>
> With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of
> provability using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p.
> That “& p” makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned,
> but a rich consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the
> propositional level) of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be
> sound (or just consistent).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions
>> anyway).
>>
>>
>>
>> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an
>> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of
>> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person
>> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the
>> sigma_1 arithmetic"
>>
>>
>>
>> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka
>> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to,
>> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some
>> teleological, causal relation.
>>
>>
>> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and
>> proved to be so when used.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about.
>>
>>
>> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical
>> logic is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between
>> proofs and model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure
>> verifying the statements of the theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse"
> etc. are used in mathematical logic [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The *domain of discourse*
> is the set N of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard
> *model* or intended *interpretation* of first-order arithmetic."], I've
> thought more recently of using *substrate *instead.
>
>
>
> Hmm… that would augment the probability of doing a mistake already done by
> early pythagoreans: to believe that arithmeticalism (only numbers) entails
> that there are things made of numbers. But Mechanism is more idealistic;
> the only “non-number-theoretical things” are only dreamed by numbers,
> through the computations mimicking them correctly in arithmetic (which
> exist by the digital mechanist assumption).
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> In the case of an experience processing language, there would be some
>> fundamental "atoms" or "units" of experientiality, like ψbits.
>>
>>
>>
>> Experience is usually private and non provable. But when machine’s
>> introspect themselves they got reason to believe in such true, from their
>> perspective, statement which are non provable.
>>
>> A unit of experience does not make sense to me, to be honest. Subjective
>> experience does not admit third person description at all, although they do
>> admit meta-pointers to them, thanks our Mechanist admission of the
>> invariance of consciousness for some digital transformation.
>>
>> Consciousness is not material. It indexical, relational, and the
>> attribute of some higher order “hero” or person. Person are conscious, not
>> things. I tend to believe that bacteria are already conscious, but that
>> consciousness is not much more differentiate than the universal
>> consciousness of its environment. It is an altered state of consciousness,
>> quite unlike the usual mundane one, which refers to long and complex path.
>> With mechanism there might be reason to expect us being very rare in the
>> physical reality.
>>
>> Consciousness is primitively the knowledge of our existence, but it is
>> not definable, nor provable, yet indubitable. All (Löbian) universal
>> machine already knows that. Consciousness is not really just consistency,
>> but it is the semantic, or truth, of that consistency. The hero get that
>> something is happening.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> On the "units of experience", that's the concern of the *micropsychism*
> literature. I wrote something yesterday on this in the context of John
> Archibald Wheeler's "it from bit":
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/
>
>
> Sum up it here please. It is an important issue. Thank you (in advance).
>
> Bruno
>
>
What are the "units of experience" is sort of the basic problem for the
panpsychical paradigm.
I am adding
References (What are the *units of experience*?)
to
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/
We are familiar basic units of conventional (informational) computing: 0s,
1s, (SKI) combinators, now qbits, those kind of things, but what are the
basic units of experience processing?
This is a new subject, and I don't have a Ph.D. in theoretical psychology,
which may or not help.
- pt
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