On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say >> that science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific >> languages - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, >> cellular biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology, ,… >> >> >> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, >> like chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with >> electron playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will >> develop higher level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. >> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing >> any language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), >> which should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality >> is phi_i independent. >> >> >> >> > > There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical > language "dialects", like "Lagrangian": > > *This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like* > > https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like > > "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the > state of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the > system can maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the > easiest and most compact ways of presenting the theory.” > > > That is technical language. It is just natural language with some > technical terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of > information, but it is open if the setting is classical or quantum, which > changes a lot the interpretation problem. > > > > > > > > > Suppose there is a conference *Languages for the Mind-Body Problem*, > including > > G* > EMPL⁺ > > > > G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical > ontological (Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity > axioms, or super-Turing elements). > > > > > The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages > which could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages. > > ⁺ *Experiential Modalities Programing Language* > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ > > > With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of > provability using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p. > That “& p” makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned, > but a rich consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the > propositional level) of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be > sound (or just consistent). > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions >> anyway). >> >> >> >> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an >> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of >> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person >> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the >> sigma_1 arithmetic" >> >> >> >> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka >> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, >> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some >> teleological, causal relation. >> >> >> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and >> proved to be so when used. >> >> >> >> >> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about. >> >> >> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical >> logic is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between >> proofs and model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure >> verifying the statements of the theory. >> >> >> >> > Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" > etc. are used in mathematical logic [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The *domain of discourse* > is the set N of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard > *model* or intended *interpretation* of first-order arithmetic."], I've > thought more recently of using *substrate *instead. > > > > Hmm… that would augment the probability of doing a mistake already done by > early pythagoreans: to believe that arithmeticalism (only numbers) entails > that there are things made of numbers. But Mechanism is more idealistic; > the only “non-number-theoretical things” are only dreamed by numbers, > through the computations mimicking them correctly in arithmetic (which > exist by the digital mechanist assumption). > > > > > >> >> >> In the case of an experience processing language, there would be some >> fundamental "atoms" or "units" of experientiality, like ψbits. >> >> >> >> Experience is usually private and non provable. But when machine’s >> introspect themselves they got reason to believe in such true, from their >> perspective, statement which are non provable. >> >> A unit of experience does not make sense to me, to be honest. Subjective >> experience does not admit third person description at all, although they do >> admit meta-pointers to them, thanks our Mechanist admission of the >> invariance of consciousness for some digital transformation. >> >> Consciousness is not material. It indexical, relational, and the >> attribute of some higher order “hero” or person. Person are conscious, not >> things. I tend to believe that bacteria are already conscious, but that >> consciousness is not much more differentiate than the universal >> consciousness of its environment. It is an altered state of consciousness, >> quite unlike the usual mundane one, which refers to long and complex path. >> With mechanism there might be reason to expect us being very rare in the >> physical reality. >> >> Consciousness is primitively the knowledge of our existence, but it is >> not definable, nor provable, yet indubitable. All (Löbian) universal >> machine already knows that. Consciousness is not really just consistency, >> but it is the semantic, or truth, of that consistency. The hero get that >> something is happening. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > On the "units of experience", that's the concern of the *micropsychism* > literature. I wrote something yesterday on this in the context of John > Archibald Wheeler's "it from bit": > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/ > > > Sum up it here please. It is an important issue. Thank you (in advance). > > Bruno > > What are the "units of experience" is sort of the basic problem for the panpsychical paradigm.

I am adding References (What are the *units of experience*?) to https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/ We are familiar basic units of conventional (informational) computing: 0s, 1s, (SKI) combinators, now qbits, those kind of things, but what are the basic units of experience processing? This is a new subject, and I don't have a Ph.D. in theoretical psychology, which may or not help. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.