On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 12:58:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> In any case, one of the "micropsychists" has a new paper just out: >> >> >> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious >> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to >> form a single unified consciousness. ..." >> >> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information >> Theory* >> Hedda Hassel Mørch >> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019) >> >> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI >> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf >> >> *Abstract* >> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that >> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. >> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality >> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an >> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. >> >> >> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a >> Vandermonde matrix: >> >> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 >> >> Brent >> >> >> > > Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has > has anything new. > > Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former. > > *I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a > thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also > philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.* > > > That of course panpsychists agree with. > > He procedes: > > *Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be > an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry > equals i^(j-1) (mod p). Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined > by f(x)=Vx. * > > Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is > wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in > something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness > ever proposed.* > > > Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: > Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical > entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing > with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities > (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but > experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic > (ontologically) as Ns*. > > *Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. > numerists, or informationists). > > > - pt > > >
The commenters to Scott's post seem to try to get into this with ψ-properties vs. Φ-properties. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
