On 2/1/2019 10:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
In any case, one of the "micropsychists" has a new paper just out:
"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious
entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend'
together to form a single unified consciousness. ..."
*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated
Information Theory*
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI <https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI>
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
<https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf>
/Abstract/
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims
that consciousness is identical to maximal integrated
information, or maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what
may be called the intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an
intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an extrinsic property;
therefore, they cannot be identical.
A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of
consciousness to a Vandermonde matrix:
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
<https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799>
Brent
Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he
has has anything new.
Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.
/I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a
thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also
philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to
be./
That of course panpsychists agree with.
He procedes:
/Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let
V be an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j)
entry equals i^(j-1) (mod p). Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update
function defined by f(x)=Vx. /
Concludes: /the fact that Integrated Information Theory is
wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in
something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of
consciousness ever proposed./
Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking:
Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with
numerical entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer"
is computing with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not
numerical entities (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the
computing, but experiential entities (experientials: Es). /Es are as
basic (ontologically) as Ns/.
*Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists
(vs. numerists, or informationists).
Yes, Scott's analysis assumes that consciousness is characterized by
some kind of computation...as does Tononi. But he observes that
whatever your theory of consciousness is it needs to at least roughly
agree as to who and what is conscious. A theory that says a large
Vandermonde matrix is conscious fails that test.
But to introduce experiential atoms is just words. It doesn't explain
anything. Where do your experiential atoms go when you are
unconscious? when you die? How do they interact with non-experiential
atoms? Are experiential atoms necessary for intelligence?
Brent
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