> On 20 May 2019, at 21:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/20/2019 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 17 May 2019, at 22:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/17/2019 7:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> No, with mechanism, mind supervenes locally on matter, but matter >>>> supervenes on the mind of all universal machines, which compete below our >>>> substitution level, and that explains directly the “many-world” >>>> appearances of matter and consciousness, where the physical threes have to >>>> introduce magical things, from the collapse of the ave to primary >>>> substance. >>> The trouble is there is not a "many-world" appearance of matter and >>> consciousness. >> It dos not stroke the eyes, but with the two slit experience, we have it, >> unless you make the non-mechanist move, and add some collapse of the wave >> postulate. That becomes a particular case of an ontological commitment added >> to arithmetic, to avoid the consequences of a theory, before any evidences >> are given. > > All the evidence IS that the wave-function collapses.
? I have not found any evidence for the collapse. The “evidence” is that “it seems to collapse”, but that “seeming” is a consequence of QM applied to both the observed and the observer (cf Everett). > That's why people have to suppose there are infinitely many orthogonal worlds > we can't intereact with in order to avoid the collapse. Which is a given with mechanism; To make an history disappear, is like to make a real number disappear. More is simpler than less (the motto of this list!). > Are you claiming that is something like Roger Penrose's gravity induce > collapse were true then "mechanism" (CT+YD) would be empirically invalidated? Yes. That is even why Penrose postulate non-mechanism. Unlike Hamerov, Penrose explicitly negate the mechanist hypothesis, and then indeed, the collapse is more than welcome. > I don't see how this follows. All computations are run in arithmetic. A collapse is like saying that the guy in Moscow is a zombie, or even not existent when you find that you were reconstituted in Washington. Of course, the complete explanation is basically my whole work, and I cannot sum up this in one post. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> >> >>> Mechanism explains too much. >> I don’t think so, not yet. The “experiments” confirms it, where simple >> consciousness refutes physicalism directly, unless we abandon mechanism. >> >> >> >>> What is this competition and how does it produce one coherent world we seem >>> to share? >> Take the phi_i (the enumeration of the partial computable function with one >> argument): >> >> I say that x emulates y on z if phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z) >> >> I say that x emulates y if for all z we have phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z) > > I don't see that the two above sentences express different ideas? What's the > difference between "on z" with no specification of z and "for all z"? > >> >> I say that u is a universal number if u emulates all numbers, >> >> Then we can show that there will be an infinity of such u, emulating you, in >> arithmetic, below your substitution level (defined by what does not >> interfere with your conscious first person state). > > Introducing "below your substitution level" implies some kind of > approximation. But I don't see the definition of "emulates" has any natural > extension to define "approximately emulates". You seem to assume that one > element competing to your consciousness is a stream of computed numbers and > there are many such streams that exactly instantiate your consciouness but > which are different "at a lower level"...which we call physics. > >> >> Assuming QM, it is like a program simulating you with one election here, in >> this or that orbital, instead of elsewhere. Below you rsubtitution level, >> there is are infinitely many computations, going through your right state. >> That is the “competition” I was alluding to. > > Seems undefined to me. Even if you define "approximately emulate" I don't > see how they "compete"? That would imply that one wins and other lose. Is > this base on Dennett's multiple draft model? > >> >> Why are we able to share it? Because we are part to a common >> histories/computations, and we get multiplied together on what is below our >> similar substation level. > > But what is below our level of consciousness is exactly what we can't share. > >> You have a computation different, even when just an election is moved (but >> kept in the same energetic orbital) in my body. >> >> Contrary to what Bruce says, this gives a notion of entanglement quite >> similar to the one in QM. Of course only the further research on the >> material modes of the Universal Löbian numbers will confirm or refute this. >> >> >> >> >>>> Physics is *the* best way to make predictions, but even to relate such >>>> predictions to some reality, physics is mute (it not even its subject >>>> matter), but physicalism needs an unknown non computational theory of mind. >>> Science doesn't need anything known...it just tries to find out. And >>> physics has done well for 400yrs without needing to invoke a >>> non-computational theory of mind...or a computational theory either. >> Yes, that it needs a non computational theory is a recent discovery. >> >> And, to be sure, it needs it only if we assume Digital Mechanism. >> >> But Plato and the neopythagoreans, as well as the neoplatonicans, got >> already the correct mechanist insight that physics cannot work, without >> eliminating person and consciousness. > But experimental physics generally assumes that experimenters have "free > will" in the sense that they make choices that are statistically independent > of one another. So far as I know, only t'Hooft advocates superdeterminism. > > Brent > > >> So, that is not really new. It is forgotten and rediscovered. Aristotle >> theology (materialism) has hidden the mind body problem under the rug from >> 1500 years. People think that Chalmers discovered the hard problem of >> consciousness, but that shows how much the mind-body problem has been >> successfully hidden. The “hard problem of consciousness” is just a >> materialist formulation of the mind-body problem. >> >> >> >>>> That makes primary matter a quite speculative notion, for which we lack >>>> evidence. >>> The evidence, as for any empirical theory, is that it's part of the >>> ontology of a theory that is consilient and has good predictive power. >> It is not much consilient. QM is the first theory which looks consilient, >> but as long as QM and GR are not fixed to be married, we cannot even say >> that physics has a theory of the “physical reality”, then, as I explained, >> if we assume mechanism we see that physics has to be reduced to machine’s >> bio-psycho-theology. And that works, where physics fails, not in any >> prediction, but in accounting for our consciousness on what we predict. It >> fails on the metaphysics, or it dismiss consciousness, or it invokes some >> magic unavailable with Mechanism. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>>> It like a creationist who would say that the theory of evolution is wrong, >>>> because it does not explain how God made all this in six days. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6fa4493a-68ef-541c-0ece-67d8616eedbe%40verizon.net. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/182c4875-5e0d-8328-03ea-f9d95fe1bf8f%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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