> On 10 May 2019, at 17:17, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:26 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > From: Jason Resch <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? >> >> Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly the >> same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. >> >> If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were >> run on different hardware. >> >> From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some >> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a >> more appropriate substrate. >> >> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto, >> comprise the whole universe. >> >> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole >> universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not >> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing? >> >> The computer on my desk is not conscious! >> >> Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any case it >> can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical with the >> whole of the universe that contains it. > Not all computations are conscious. But those that are must include a large > part, if not all, of the physical universe. > > > Such a computation sounds more like a Boltzmann Brain than the type of > universe I think we inhabit. I think our brains, weighing only a kilogram or > two make up a small part of the observable universe. > > >> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in >> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from >> which the consciousnesses and universes are different. >> >> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in >> computer within a very different universe? Clearly then the outside and >> inside view would be very different. >> >> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct over >> all computations running through your conscious self. >> >> You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and continue to >> jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of universe. > If the theory is to make any sense, any reference to "the universe" must be > consistent with every other reference to "the universe". > > > > Einstein's paper on special relativity begins with one concept of time, and > by the end of the paper refines it to a more accurate conception of time. I > don't think this is any different. Here we start with a conventional meaning > of "physical universe", and by the end we show how the reasoning leads to a > more refined concept of universe.
Good answer, but that is hard to swallow for Aristotelian, and doubly so if they are not aware that the existence of a primitive physical universe is not a fact, but a (theological, or metaphysical) theory. Bruno > > > >> To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can be >> clear which one we are speaking of: >> >> 1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical >> component which implements its functions digitally (here we change nothing >> about our assumption of what the physical universe is) >> 2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an appropriately >> programmed digital computer > That implies that my consciousness is just a single computation, potentially > implemented on a linear Turing machine. > > > > > That I said supervene implies that a many-to-one relationship between > computations and mental states. > This is no different from any other functionalist or even physicalist > theories of mind. That there are neutrinos going through your brain means > there are different physical states, but these neutrinos (supposedly) don't > alter your conscious state. Therefore, that many different different patterns > of neutrinos in your brain result in the same mental/conscious state suggests > a many-to-one relationship between physical states and mental states. > > >> 3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the >> computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of >> physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the >> functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is >> important to preserve consciousness (note that nothing to this point has >> changed anything about our assumption of reality, the ontology, etc.) >> 4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all >> computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in arithmetic. >> (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes that are distinct >> from physical universes, here we modify our ontological assumptions about >> what a physical universe is) > Why should we assume arithmetical realism? > > > You don't need to, but if you do this implies the infinite computations, and > therefore the existence of all possible mental states. It leads to the "many > histories", and can explain many physical facts. > For example, this paper outlines several: > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf> > Simple physical laws that are probabilistic > Persistent regularities > An external world that contains the observer > Inter-subjective agreement on physical laws > Subjective immortality > Simple initial conditions > Observation of a universe that evolves in time > Observation of a universe with an absolute beginning in time > All of these conclusions are reached constructively from the very basic > assumption that all observer states exist (as detailed in the paper). > > This is a motivation for assuming arithmetical realism. (It's the simplest > theory, which assumes the least, and is consistent with all the facts at > hand). > > > >> 5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable >> programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your >> substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the >> future, then making predictions about future experiences (the focus of >> physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding the distribution of >> unique programs existing below your substitution level. We have now reached >> the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived from the arithmetic >> concerning conscious programs which exist arithmetically, here we >> acknowledge that no observer exists in any single universe). > If the programs are indistinguishable, how can they 'diverge in the future'. > > > The programs are indistinguishable from the first-person point of view, in > terms of the consciousness it supports, not from its third-person description > (e.g., my neutrino example). > > Another example is my operating system and browser example. The browser may > start of identically on two different operating systems, but then diverge as > new information from the local environment enters the browser (a sub-program > of the operating system). > > It has not been specified what part of the execution stream of any program > gives rise to some conscious moment -- is it short or long; one machine state > or many; in sequence or not? > > > If it is a complex state, it may involve many machine states. For example, > consider any arithmetical function, which takes an integer and returns an > integer. Let's say the function takes any integer N and returns 1 if it is > prime and 0 if it is composite. This function, viewed atomically, may > require billions of independent machine states and micro-instructions before > it completes the computation. At no single time is the state of machine > identical with the function being computed, rather the computation must be > viewed in its entirety. Also, there are many ways the function could be > computed, as you hinted, it could be serial, or parallel, it might look for > factors from N-1 down to 2, or from 2 up to N-1, it might only search from 2 > to sqrt(N), it might use some number field sieve method. All of these are > "functionally equivalent", because at the highest level, looking at only the > inputs and the outputs, it is impossible to distinguish between any of these > possible implementations. I think this analogy carries forward when > considering conscious states: there can be many implementations, and the > machine states should not be confused with the conscious states, which > instead are more like high-level functions. > > I have a real problem understanding what might be meant by the statistical > question that determines your actual future. Statistics applies to the > behaviour of ensembles of individuals. The individuals are not affected by > the statistics. So if there are an infinite number of computations passing > through my current conscious state, diverging in the future (as in the past), > then that corresponds to many individuals that might share some experience -- > there is no single individual that encapsulates the statistics of the > ensemble. > > > The problem arises because a consequence of computationalism is that > teleportation is in theory possible. If your brain state is destroyed at one > location and re-instantiated elsewhere you will survive. Now what happens > when your brain state is re-instantiated in a million different locations? > You have a non-zero probability of subjectively perceiving yourself to end up > in any of those million locations. While your threads of computation do not > interact, you can end up as any of them, despite any location you might start > from. > > >> So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical universe, we >> see there are at least 3 connotations: >> A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical structure >> which may or may not contain observers >> B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps shared) >> observation in the mind of some observer(s) >> C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical laws, >> applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws >> can be derived from the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the >> notion of an observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is >> supported by an infinity of similar, but distinct computations > > These concepts of 'the universe' are not consistent. If you are claiming that > notion C) can be obtained by an argument starting with A), then your > argument is incoherent. > > > Getting to B and C does follow automatically from A, but from assumptions of > computationalism and arithmetical realism, as I detailed in steps #1 - #5. > Over the course of those steps, I detail when the notion of "physical > universe" is amended by the reasoning or the assumptions. > >> So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical >> construct over all the computations running through your conscious self", >> you are correct that this is the logical end and conclusion of the theory of >> computationalism. But when I said you could implement any consciousness in >> any universe where it is possible to build a Turing machine, I am talking >> about the "level A" type universe. (which I acknowledge to be redundant and >> eventually eliminated in the theory, but use this example for pedagogical >> purposes). > Any concept introduced for pedagogical purposes must be consistent with the > endpoint of the argument. That is not the case here. You start with an > independent physical universe and claim to derive a universe based on an > infinity of conscious computations. This is a reductio. > > > What is the logical problem, can you point it out to me? > > >> So any external universe is part of that construct through your >> consciousness. So appealing to an external universe running a simulation >> does not help at all. >> >> Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through >> that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in silicon >> or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single computation. >> >> That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that >> state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself with >> any one particular thread of computation. In this sense that consciousness >> is not the same as one of the programs passing through that state. But to >> say the consciousness is not identical with one of the computations is >> different from saying that computation is not conscious. >> >> The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption. >> >> It follows from there being a level of digital substitution (the >> computationalist assumption). Let's say we can substitute your >> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom in your neuron to a >> precision of 20 decimal places. This means we could also substitute your >> consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom using a precision of >> 50 decimal places, or 100. Your consciousness would be no different. >> However, given enough time these simulations would eventually diverge. > That relates to substrate independence: it says nothing about different > threads of computation. You take one thing to imply something completely > different -- which is illogical. > > > Just as for substrate independence there is a notion in multiple > realizability (in the physicalist sense) there is in functionalism an > analogous notion of multiple realizability with functions (as in my example > above with different implementations of functions that determine if a number > is prime). > > >> If the future of any conscious moment depends on the statistics over the >> infinite number of computations running through that state, then a single >> computation gives a conscious moment that does not have a coherent future. >> >> I think we are in agreement here. The experiences of a single computation >> would/could eventually discover it has deviated from the normal expected >> statistics. > Taking statistics of individual conscious moments is not a meaningful > exercise. > > > I don't think so. It might mean that given enough time a simulated AI could > eventually determine it is being simulated. I need to think about this more. > > >> Neither does a single computation exist in a coherent world, since physics, >> and the appearance of matter, is also the result of the statistics over the >> infinite number of computations. >> >> Once we replace our "level A" view of physics, with the realization in >> "level C" that there is no physical world, then it becomes another question >> altogether where we can really perform computations or not, or just create >> the appearance in our own minds of running computations. > So answering "Yes" to the doctor is merely a mental aberration? > > >> However I believe that physical universes exist as programs which themselves >> contain sub-programs which are observers. Otherwise I am not sure how we >> would explain our apparently shared reality. > The existence of an independent third person world is certainly a problem for > computationalism. You have not solved that problem here. > > > > > I think Markus Muller (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf > <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf>) has gone a long way towards doing so. > > >> Who am I e-mailing if not some other conscious observer with which is >> connected somehow as part of a larger structure? This also implies that if >> I, as an actor in this larger program, fashion a computer, it can implement >> another sub-program which may also be an observer. True our infinite >> diverging paths of consciousness will diverge and split and recombine, etc., >> but in each case we can expect to find ourselves to be a computation that is >> consistent with our existence. > That is probably the biggest leap of faith of them all -- how can you > possible ensure this? Most computations do not correspond to anything useful > for our existence. > > > > What are you referring to when you say "most computations"? I don't disagree > with your point, but you can say the same about everything in physics. Most > space doesn't have anything to do with life, etc. > > >> To be conscious as a human generally would imply a sub program that has >> existed in a much larger program which has been on going for long enough and >> with the right conditions for human beings to evolve and arise. For this >> reason, I believe the local physical laws (not global) are strongly >> dependent/correlated with the mind in question. > Why do local physical laws differ from the global laws? > > > For clarity, by local laws I mean things like the mass of the electron (or > even the existence of something that could be called the electron). Global > laws are things like the points I enumerated in Markus Muller's paper, such > as "physical laws are simple and probabilistic". > > Local laws differ for different observers because they are different > possibilities compatible with conscious observers. > > If the laws are mind independent at the start of the argument, they cannot > become dependent on your mind, or anyone else's, through the course of the > argument. > > > They are mind dependent for those universes that contain minds. > > >> And consciousness must be embedded in a coherent "world" in order to exist. >> >> Does it? I am not so sure. > What are you conscious of? Consciousness itself? Or of the qualia of > experience of an external world? > > > > > The latter, I guess I wasn't sure what you meant by coherent world. I think I > get it now and agree (at least for the majority of minds/conscious states, > some might inhabit delusional or incoherent realms, be Boltzmann brains, > etc.). > > Jason > > > >> This makes one suspect that YD + CT, leading to computationalism, is not a >> coherent theory. >> >> Based on your questions and objections I can tell you have put a lot of good >> thought into these matters. I look forward to our future discussions on the >> topic. >> >> Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/146da7b0-950d-c620-9dd1-462766179669%40optusnet.com.au > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/146da7b0-950d-c620-9dd1-462766179669%40optusnet.com.au?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh1j0yNCFYoaGzaYL%3Dr9KuXdvB6T3Hh3MVdrGt9OdG9Wg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh1j0yNCFYoaGzaYL%3Dr9KuXdvB6T3Hh3MVdrGt9OdG9Wg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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