[Krimel] This began as the question of whether ideas are distinct from words. I proposed that emotions are ideas which are distinct from words because motional communication of complex ideas is possible without reference to words.
Dan said: An idea is a symbol or a concept that isn't necessary to put into words. An image, a sound, or even an odor could be an idea, or at least the germ of an idea. In the latter sense, ideas are pre-linguistic or perhaps under certain circumstances meta-linguistic might be a better way to put it. Some images go beyond words. Remember when (The Artist Formerly Known As) Prince took an unpronounceable symbol as his legal name? [Krimel] I agree with Dan's suggestion that sense data might qualify as ideas. This might stretch what he says a bit but I would be willing to entertain ideas that are other than words, meta- or pre- linguistic perhaps but a-linguistic certainly. To the two that are one the table: sensation and emotion I would add memory. Craig raised the priority issue but this presupposes the ontological distinction between words and ideas. The notion of sembiotic co-evolution still retains it. The question of whether people understand words in the same way likewise presupposes the distinction between words and ideas. Ron raises the issue of context. Isn't context another form of communication without words? Matt: Well, don't everybody jump in now. Krimel suggested a few emotions as examples of ideas that can be communicated without words. On the one hand, I think Craig's right that emotions themselves aren't ideas, just as rocks aren't ideas, but Krimel's deeper point is not that joy itself is an idea (there's joy, and then there's the idea of joy) but that we can communicate it without words, which is part of Dan's point. [Krimel] I didn't hear Craig say that emotions are not ideas. He said they were biological processes. Aren't ideas biological processes? Aren't communicative acts biological processes? [Matt] Granted that I have a very counter-intuitive understanding of language (a philosophy of language hocked from Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson), such that I would count all communicative acts (writing, speaking, hand waving, winking, etc.) as "linguistic." Perhaps a perversion, but as Ron notes, "meaning always requires context," and any act can become symbolic given the proper background context--hence the occasional difficulty in telling when somebody's eye twitches, or when they are winking. [Krimel] You have gone from word and ideas are the same thing to communicative acts and ideas are the same thing. A word is now everything from sonnets to farting. I am actually not against a broad definition of words. But I strongly object to your attempt to apply a very narrow definition of ideas. [Matt] So I'd rather not quibble about the linguistic/non-linguistic communicative line, for as I see it, it makes no difference. So for the moment, I think Krimel's point is answered insofar as a) emotions are not ideas and b) symbolic communication as a whole is what we'll stipulate we're talking about. Dan's after something a little bit more when he says an "idea is a symbol or a concept that isn't necessary to put into words." This is a radical disjunct between the two, and I don't think Craig's ecumenical suggestion of co-emergence will do: the problem I have is telling the difference between ideas and words. [Krimel] But no! An expansive definition of ideas would include sensation, emotion, memory and context or anything else we think up later. Or we could narrowly define words as parts of languages which are subsets of communicative acts. Under such a narrow definition words and ideas still come out as ontologically distinct as within languages word order carries meaning. Syllables carry meaning as prefixes and suffixes. If we are talking about words and ideas we should adopt either strict or loose definitions to both at once; not a loose definition on one side and a tight one on the other. [Matt] I'm not going to argue that we don't use the word "idea" to refer to a few more complex things than just words, but does that tell us something about ideas, or does that tell us something about the way we use the word "idea"? [Krimel] But I am saying that the word idea applies to less complex things as well. And I am saying that we have very complex ideas that either can not or do not require words or even communicative acts. [Matt] I have no problem with things that are difficult to express or paintings that evoke something that seems, as Dan put it, "beyond words." Indeed, I have no doubt that these things, e.g. the Mona Lisa and love, are beyond words, but difficulty to put into words is a difficulty in communication--and what do we say about something incommunicable? I'm not saying the incommunicable doesn't exist, but is an idea incommunicable? What I'm ultimately suggesting is that we sort out some of our linguistic habits a little differently than we commonly do. Ideas, concepts--I'm not sure what these things are except words in use. [Krimel] I think your argument here flows entirely from your loose/strict imbalance. The real imbalance is imbedded in the communicative act between ideas and their expression. An idea, any idea, for any individual is more than just what communicable. In any individual the experience of an idea will be perceived as a mixture of the past and present. It will integrate sense memory, vague feelings, cultural heritage, the contents of Fibber McGee's closet compressed into a zip file. Compression in this case is lossy. When the communication is received most of the purely subjective parts are lost. Your definition just ignores the lost in lossy communication. But what is lost to the receiver is replaced by the receiver own compressible closet of non-verbal ideation. [Matt] What you might say, of course, is what's the big deal? "Matt, if you already concede that there's more than just linguistic communication, and that some things are incommunicable, then is this more than quibbling over words?" Well, first, it's all quibbling over words, but second, in the philosophical community there are two struggles that this issue gets involved with: are words representational? and what is the mind? It is with this background in mind that I claimed abruptly that the notion of ideas being distinct from words in some philosophically pregnant way is a piece of SOM. [Krimel] I think this question of lossiness is too important to define away. But you have now expanded this ideas and words question about the mind and representation. How is whether it is or isn't SOM, relevant? [Matt] One version of the representational thing goes something like this: (from the intro to my "Language, SOM, Pathos of Distance"): "Representationalism is the contemporary, professional term for the idea that language represents objects. We can easily see this as part of the Subject-Object paradigm by emphasizing how language _in here_, in the mind, is supposed to represent objects of cognition _out there_. So, the line continues, since values aren't objects _out there_, as far as we can tell, they must only exist as linguistic structures, which means they only exist in your mind, your head, the subject. Therefore they're subjective, your morals and values are hinged only on _your_ perspective, and since your perspective is eternally different from anybody else's (unless you've divined a way into other people's heads), values can't be compared and are, really, whatever you like." The problem with representationalism, whether its the problem of how your words represent outer objects (rocks) or how they represent inner objects (ideas), is that a distance is created between the word and the object, but this distance isn't a practical distance, such as difficulty of expression, it is a _metaphysical_ distance. This creates a problem: if our words function by attempting to represent an object, how do we know if they are representing it correctly, how do we know if they are _ever_ representing correctly? [Krimel] Here you invert the problem. We go from words are supposed to be equal to ideas to, "the idea that language represents objects." Are you saying that words are also the same as objects? You say, "language _in here_, in the mind, is supposed to represent objects of cognition _out there_." Again what is _out there_ is represented _in here_ but not simply by language. Representation occurs in memory before it occurs in communicative acts. Through memory, the present is iterated. Remembered ideas are associations we have with past events and our past and present experiences are much more than linguistic or purely communicative. [Matt] The mind question is actually a little more familiar and relates easier to Pirsig. This is the idea that a "mind" is an inner space that holds certain immaterial objects like ideas (since Bo takes Pirsig's intellectual level to be the creation of this "inner space," he thinks the S/O divide is the intellectual level, which explains his last post on this subject). Lots of questions about this one, but ultimately the question in this case is going to be: why do we have two immaterial objects in our mind, linguistic concepts and prelinguistic ideas? [Krimel] I don't see how you have shown that linguistic concepts are not distinct from a-linguistic ideas. Nor is there any indication of how they became immaterial or why this is bad. If I tentatively allow that _mind_ is some kind of inner space then what ever the _space_ is _full_ of is immaterial. [Matt] There are a lot of different kinds of answers to all of these questions, and its a huge area to spin around. As Pirsigians, I think the best direction is to bear in mind: 1) we are always directly connected to reality. I take this to mean there are no metaphysical divides of the kind I mentioned earlier, only practical ones. For instance, whatever you decide to take ideas to be, distinct from words or identical, if you want to remain true to Pirsig's spirit, I think you must refrain from the idea that there are things inherently ineffable--what's ineffable today is just a DQ jolt away from becoming tomorrow's trail of crusty static patterns. [Krimel] Our "direct connection" is restricted to the transduction of energy from the outer world into patterns of electro-chemical energy that is the inner world. Are those patterns ineffable? They are sustainable and reproducible and transducable. Rather than calling it inner space perhaps virtual space is better. We can construct virtual space and place ourselves inside it as objects. As when, we see ourselves on the surface of a spinning ball rotating around another ball suspended in space. DQ reminds us that we must be careful how much trust we but in static patterns. Sometimes even the earth moves really and virtually. But I hope that last signals your acceptance the DQ is not always 'better.' I think you have captured there exactly why Quality is undefined. [Matt] 2) Pirsig's levels are built on top of each other. I take this to mean that our mind, our intellect, our ideas, do not "directly" confront the world in isolation from the rest of humanity--the intellectual level grew out of the social. This may seem an immediate volt-face, but all it suggests is that ideas are communicative and our relation to the world is not a simple Person-World connection, but a triangulation between Person-Community-World. Without a doubt, we are directly connected to reality, but communication is a negotiation between all interested parties. [Krimel] I buy most of this expect that strictly speaking community is part of the world not separated from it. So to the extent that the Person-World connection is simple, which I claim it is not, that is still what you have. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
