Matt began: What is an idea if not words? I think the idea that ideas are pre-linguistic is a remnant of SOM.
Krimel then said: What are words if not symbols for ideas? I am not at all sure how the notion of pre-linguistic or even a-linguistic ideation is a remnant of SOM. Matt said: Well, first think of it this way: I say ideas are words, you say there are ideas _and_ words. In terms of ontology, you have two categories to my one and by Ockham's Razor, choosing the simplest explanation, my single category would win out. That's, naturally, the beginning of a conversation as I'm trying to thrust the burden of proof on you. Why do we _need_ the idea of an "idea" that's distinct from words? Krimel said: Joy, sorrow and disgust are all ideas that can easily and effectively be communicated with or without words. The fact that they both exist and can be communicated in the absence of words suggests that they are ontologically distinct from words. Dan said: An idea is a symbol or a concept that isn't necessary to put into words. An image, a sound, or even an odor could be an idea, or at least the germ of an idea. In the latter sense, ideas are pre-linguistic or perhaps under certain circumstances meta-linguistic might be a better way to put it. Some images go beyond words. Remember when (The Artist Formerly Known As) Prince took an unpronouncable symbol as his legal name? Craig said: Might this not be a chicken-&-egg problem? Might it not be that words & ideas emerged/evolved together? [Q: Which came first words or ideas? A: Mu] If joy, sorrow and disgust are biological states, they can be perceived without being conceptualized. (As one animal senses fear in another. Or one animal intimidates another.) How do you know that you have the same concept of 'joy', for instance, that everyone else does (& of course it must be the same concept), prior to knowing you use the word 'joy' the same as they do? Ron said: Craig brings up a valid subject that even the display of emotion may be contextual in meaning. So I must disagree that a contextual structure is Not required to communicate. Meaning always requires context. The Maori Express anger and hostility to welcome guests. I've known folks to express Joy through weeping. Anger through silence. Disgust through laughter. Matt: Well, don't everybody jump in now. Krimel suggested a few emotions as examples of ideas that can be communicated without words. On the one hand, I think Craig's right that emotions themselves aren't ideas, just as rocks aren't ideas, but Krimel's deeper point is not that joy itself is an idea (there's joy, and then there's the idea of joy) but that we can communicate it without words, which is part of Dan's point. Granted that I have a very counter-intuitive understanding of language (a philosophy of language hocked from Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson), such that I would count all communicative acts (writing, speaking, hand waving, winking, etc.) as "linguistic." Perhaps a perversion, but as Ron notes, "meaning always requires context," and any act can become symbolic given the proper background context--hence the occasional difficulty in telling when somebody's eye twitches, or when they are winking. So I'd rather not quibble about the linguistic/non-linguistic communicative line, for as I see it, it makes no difference. So for the moment, I think Krimel's point is answered insofar as a) emotions are not ideas and b) symbolic communication as a whole is what we'll stipulate we're talking about. Dan's after something a little bit more when he says an "idea is a symbol or a concept that isn't necessary to put into words." This is a radical disjunct between the two, and I don't think Craig's ecumenical suggestion of co-emergence will do: the problem I have is telling the difference between ideas and words. Indeed, Craig lays the way with some vintage Wittgenstein: "How do you know that you have the same concept of 'joy,' for instance, that everyone else does ..., prior to knowing you use the word 'joy' the same as they do?" This is the problem in a nutshell. I'm not going to argue that we don't use the word "idea" to refer to a few more complex things than just words, but does that tell us something about ideas, or does that tell us something about the way we use the word "idea"? I have no problem with things that are difficult to express or paintings that evoke something that seems, as Dan put it, "beyond words." Indeed, I have no doubt that these things, e.g. the Mona Lisa and love, are beyond words, but difficulty to put into words is a difficulty in communication--and what do we say about something incommunicable? I'm not saying the incommunicable doesn't exist, but is an idea incommunicable? What I'm ultimately suggesting is that we sort out some of our linguistic habits a little differently than we commonly do. Ideas, concepts--I'm not sure what these things are except words in use. What you might say, of course, is what's the big deal? "Matt, if you already concede that there's more than just linguistic communication, and that some things are incommunicable, then is this more than quibbling over words?" Well, first, it's all quibbling over words, but second, in the philosophical community there are two struggles that this issue gets involved with: are words representational? and what is the mind? It is with this background in mind that I claimed abruptly that the notion of ideas being distinct from words in some philosophically pregnant way is a piece of SOM. One version of the representational thing goes something like this: (from the intro to my "Language, SOM, Pathos of Distance"): "Representationalism is the contemporary, professional term for the idea that language represents objects. We can easily see this as part of the Subject-Object paradigm by emphasizing how language _in here_, in the mind, is supposed to represent objects of cognition _out there_. So, the line continues, since values aren't objects _out there_, as far as we can tell, they must only exist as linguistic structures, which means they only exist in your mind, your head, the subject. Therefore they're subjective, your morals and values are hinged only on _your_ perspective, and since your perspective is eternally different from anybody else's (unless you've divined a way into other people's heads), values can't be compared and are, really, whatever you like." The problem with representationalism, whether its the problem of how your words represent outer objects (rocks) or how they represent inner objects (ideas), is that a distance is created between the word and the object, but this distance isn't a practical distance, such as difficulty of expression, it is a _metaphysical_ distance. This creates a problem: if our words function by attempting to represent an object, how do we know if they are representing it correctly, how do we know if they are _ever_ representing correctly? The mind question is actually a little more familiar and relates easier to Pirsig. This is the idea that a "mind" is an inner space that holds certain immaterial objects like ideas (since Bo takes Pirsig's intellectual level to be the creation of this "inner space," he thinks the S/O divide is the intellectual level, which explains his last post on this subject). Lots of questions about this one, but ultimately the question in this case is going to be: why do we have two immaterial objects in our mind, linguistic concepts and prelinguistic ideas? There are a lot of different kinds of answers to all of these questions, and its a huge area to spin around. As Pirsigians, I think the best direction is to bear in mind 1) we are always directly connected to reality. I take this to mean there are no metaphysical divides of the kind I mentioned earlier, only practical ones. For instance, whatever you decide to take ideas to be, distinct from words or identical, if you want to remain true to Pirsig's spirit, I think you must refrain from the idea that there are things inherently ineffable--what's ineffable today is just a DQ jolt away from becoming tomorrow's trail of crusty static patterns. And 2) Pirsig's levels are built on top of each other. I take this to mean that our mind, our intellect, our ideas, do not "directly" confront the world in isolation from the rest of humanity--the intellectual level grew out of the social. This may seem an immediate volt-face, but all it suggests is that ideas are communicative and o ur relation to the world is not a simple Person-World connection, but a triangulation between Person-Community-World. Without a doubt, we are directly connected to reality, but communication is a negotiation between all interested parties. 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