Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting tiresome,
to say the least.
I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the 'early
cosmos' from 'this our existential one' contra an Aristotelian one 'once there
exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three
category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only
emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. There are no
categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began our universe.
That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero'....This
pure zero is the nothing of not having been born......boundless freedom".
6.217. My reading of this is that this pure zero is NOT the same as Firstness,
because, my reading of Firstness is that it is an embedded state of feeling,
which means, that its nature is to express a quality of some form of
matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... Therefore, my reading of this
pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce notes "unbounded potentiality'.
This "Nothingness of boundless freedom 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same
as the logic of freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].
"What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became potentiality
of this or that sort - that is ,of some quality' 6.220. Now - my reading is
that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the
unit of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing moved into
Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore Red is
possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' within matter -
as Firstness....where something is possible. Not unbounded possibility but
something is possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different
from the 'zero of boundless possibility'.
2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the definite'
6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a
continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the
individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be differentiated
units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of relations or Thirdness
begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. "The general indefinite
potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" 6.199.
3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the
blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of some
stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this blackboard is POST
Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare possibility'. Instead, it is
POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point appears - that chalk line. [I'll
leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. As a point, it has identity, that
continuity-of-being that Peirce refers to ['There is a certain element of
continuity in this line" 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in itself,
operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is discrete and
distinct.
And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE -
Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units
appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded within
the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and Secondness. It
'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and develops generalizing
laws.
That's how I see this metaphor.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most active
participants.
I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big Bang
(note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really bring
such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the modifier
"loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have to
distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 1898
Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) contra a
more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, particular three
category semiosic universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward.
So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not?
One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic universe
we inhabit, but the conditions for any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to
arise. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no explicit mention of God
here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely scientific hypothesis. So,
perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Edwina, List:
Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to be
consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again leave
it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical with
that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a
generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does exist as a
state of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an openness, BUT, this
state is itself an experience, entire in itself, and as such, it exists within
that experience of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied
Firstness! Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be embodied. It is
simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or
reaction.
You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence
of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i don't
see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore, where
there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which
nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My reading of that, is that there
was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this 'original chaos' -
no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any
Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such as
the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because
it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
actions.
With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous state of
existence which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this
state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within Relations;
they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of
existence [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to
another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by
other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not be
accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and
might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might
disappear in a month.
The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes
in the larger system.
Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and
refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this
as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no
explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then,
I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been First
Cause. I simply don't know.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Clark, List:
Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to
refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I
understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but
also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction
to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is
self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility)
to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that
Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step
unexplained.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
wrote:
On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force
by the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter
of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to
such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force
- and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is
that I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather
than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that
could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad
thing!
Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating
over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t
causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own
unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little
is necessary and most things are underdetermined is problematic.
I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons
too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian
formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or
Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite
conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function
(what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s
hard to make sense of causality in terms of it.
Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments
against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended
argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can
be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality.
He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably
his very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other
comments about it that are relevant to this discussion.
CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed,
all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my
original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations of
single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ... But
during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first suggested
itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of the original
hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have struck me in
my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so
much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out
that there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not
arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was most struck by the
difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to make
all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes Time. (R
842, emphasis added)
I think this might be better read as there being no cause for
firstness not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re
talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an element
in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of causation. (Although
I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too has the genealogy in
problematic metaphysical understanding)
I should add that this problem of language for this foundational
event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the
platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While I’ll
confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical reason for
the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels could dance on
a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in medieval
scholasticism)
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