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Hi Ben, List,
Thanks for the thought and effort you put into this response.
Your argument makes sense to me and is consistent with what else
I know. I will definitely keep this response, which clears up
many confusions that I had a part in this thread in
perpetuating.
This argument, your argument summarizing your understanding
of Peirce, strikes me as a likely true proposition and therefore
real. The implication of the argument is that a something which
is logical and not known to be false may be real. A unicorn or
unicorns in general are not real. (The thought of a unicorn is
real, but what is real is the thought, not the unicorn.)
However, were we to encounter a unicorn in the woods, that would
be a surprising fact that would cause us to re-assess that
reality.
Another implication is that any supposition understood as
logical with what else we know to be true for which we have no
falsifying evidence is (may be) also real. I presume, prior to
testing, that any legitimate abductive hypothesis would also be
real (or should be, else we pose a false hypothesis). Testing
may surface new falsities, which would cause cause the
hypothesis to be rejected and then seen as not real.
Still another implication seems to be that reality should be
treated in a similar way to how Peirce handles truth. That is,
as limit functions; we may never be able to have absolute
confidence. Only falsity or errors in logic can render something
as not real, though our confidence in actual reality is
dependent on the preponderance of evidence.
Do those implications sound about right?
So, I am satisfied that your argument fits within my
understanding of fallibilism and Peirce's emphasis on the
scientific method. Thanks for helping to clarify my thinking! I
think this does place Horace before Descartes.
Best, Mike
On 2/11/2017 12:45 PM, Benjamin Udell
wrote:
Mike, list,
I think that you're putting the cart before the unicorn. The
idea of the unreal a.k.a. fictitious in Peirce begins as the
idea of the object of a false proposition, an idea rooted, for
Peirce, not in ontology but in logic and its presuppositions, to
which ontology is posterior. There are true general propositions
if and only if there are real generals. There are false general
propositions if and only if there are fictitious, a.k.a. unreal,
generals. If there were no false general propositions, then
science would have little if any purpose, since it would be
unable to err about generals even if it wanted to. No more
proofs by reduction to absurdity. The object of a sign is
ultimately the universe of discourse of said object. If it is
false that there has existed a unicorn, then a universe of
discourse in which there has existed a unicorn is an unreal,
fictitious universe of discourse. For Peirce, logic and reason
presuppose that, for a proposition to be true, it must not
depend on what we think of it, likewise for its object to be
real, it must not depend on what we think of it; for it to be
real, it must also be cognizable, such that sufficient inquiry
would find it inevitably, sooner or later. The presuppositions
of fallibilism and cognizabilism are both needed in order to
keep the way of inquiry unbarred.
After that, we can bring all kinds of nuances in, e.g., a
universe of discourse that is at least a coarse-grained version
of our actual world in the vast majority of respects, except in
containing a unicorn. People could argue about whether a
unicorn's evolution is feasible or probable. If it were
significantly feasible or probable, we could say that the
unicorn species (as a kind of form) is a really feasible or
probable possibility, and we could dub animals belonging to the
predecessor species that would evolve into unicorns as
"unicorniferous" or suchlike, and regard that as a property as
real as the hardness of a diamond even if nothing ever happens
to try to scratch that diamond. We could regard the capacity for
harboring unicorns as a real property of the Earth. Suppose that
a highly intelligent observer were on Earth hundreds of millions
of years ago, when animals first emerged onto land. That
observer might have predicted that flying animals would evolve
some day. It's happened at least four times, so it seems quite
feasible. A square circle, on the other hand, is _necessarily_
unreal by the definitions of the terms (if a square were defined
not as an equilateral rectangle but as an equiangular
equilateral quadrilateral, then I suppose something could be
both a circle and a kind of degenerate square in some
non-Euclidean space). Even in mathematics it's not always so
cut-and-dried, e.g., the case of zero to the zeroth power, and
there the issue is not simply a touch of the arbitrary in the
definition of an object (still, mathematicians seem to regard 0⁰
as most "naturally" equal to 1 rather than equal to 0 or
undefined). Of course then there are the mathematical
intuitionists. Most mathematicians aren't intuitionists, but the
intuitionists and some others convinced most mathematicians to
prefer constructive proofs. If we get into that subject, I'm
afraid I'll get lost. The more specialized discussions of what
is real in various domains usually involves some applications of
philosophical thinking. I've seen the theory of limits referred
to as "the metaphysics of mathematical analysis" and the
philosopher Berkeley actually did motivate work there.
The idea that the unicorn or its species is real because of a
corresponding factor or style in thought and culture involves
the kind of equivocation about the term "unicorn" that people
often delight in. "Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus." http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Santa+Claus%22
. The 1947 movie _Miracle on 34th Street_ plays on
it too, particularly in the trial scenes. I used to go along
with that kind of realism about Santa Claus, Cthulhu https://www.google.com/search?q=Yes%2C+Virginia%2C+there+is+a+Cthulhu
, and others, in a kind of rebellious spirit, but their
'reality' depends too much on what actual people think of them.
They are dreams, nightmares, make-believes, etc., real in the
way that dreams and nightmares are, thoughts that take place on
actual dates, classes of such thoughts, etc.
Best, Ben
On 2/11/2017 10:44 AM, Mike Bergman wrote:
Hi Edwina,
Thanks, I like your explanations, which probably fit better
with standard Peircean arguments. Please see my comments
below:
On 2/11/2017 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Mike, list: I think that we are each using terms
differently. As you say, these differences have to be made
clear.
1) For example, my understanding of realism is
that it affirms that generals have a functional formative
reality; this function is to be transformed from this
potentiality into non-general existential actual
individual 'examples' of that generality.
This is not, perhaps, the same meaning as 'real',
which might refer instead to the individual materially
existent unit of that potential generality.
In my view, unicorns, as general mental concepts function
within the realm of realism. They DO transform
into 'non-general existential actual individual examples'
of that generality. The fact that they remain conceptual
rather than material does not take away this reality.
They are not universal; I doubt if such concepts
as 'unicorn' appear in the mindset of the Bantu or Dobe
!Kung, but they are an integral part of the Western
ideology. To deny concepts within the realm of realism
seems to me to be a movement, as you say, to nominalism
and materialism.
I believe this follows within Peirce's view that even if
the general does not become instantiated into an
Interpretant - this does not take away its 'realism'. My
point is that realism, as a domain of generality, includes
both that which can become material and that which can
become only conceptual.
I agree with how you treat the conceptual unicorn. But I
think the distinction between real and realism is strained. I
have been arguing that the real is so even if a thought or
conceptual; being material may be a character of something,
but is not a requisite for it being 'real'. I think we both
would agree that Peirce holds beliefs guide both knowledge and
action. To my mind, that makes them as real as anything else,
even though beliefs are not material, and most believers
believe that their beliefs are not provably true.
2) With regard, Mike, to your outline of:
"Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and "unicorn"
as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the
Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only
real that exists within the triad is the Object, unless we
make the Interpretant or the Representamen as the "objects"
of our attention."
I'm puzzled by the triadic format of the above. I would
agree that the Dynamic Object is 'the idea of a unicorn'.
I'm not sure what you mean by 'unicorn as the
Representamen'..unless you mean the general concept of
unicorn as held within a community of people [this list for
example]. I don't see, however, that JonAS, is the
Interpretant. Do you mean his own personal concept of
'unicorn'? And I would think that the 'realism of a
unicorn' is held within the general habit of thought within
the Representamen.
I probably do not have the mastery of sign terminology to
explain this better. The symbol "unicorn" in this instance is
the Representamen. How do we interpret that symbol? I am
suggesting, as do you, that the correct Dynamical Object is
the 'idea of a unicorn', which we agree is real. If, instead,
we interpret the symbol "unicorn" as a cloved mammal with a
twisted horn, we begin conflating the name with the object.
Since we know that unicorns have never been verified to exist
and are extremely likely to not be actual, we act to
materialize the object (analogous to other things such as deer
or horses that share many characters) and now call it not
real. This is a subtle way by which nominalism can confuse our
interpretation of whether something is real or not. (Under
this interpretation, then, you may have Interpretants that are
shaded more towards nominalism, whereas others are shaded to
realism. It is one reason to argue against the nominalistic
context.) As I stated before, materialism is not a requirement
for real in my judgment.
I'm sure there is a more precise way to use Peirce's sign
terminology to explain this better. Sorry that I keep
stumbling around on this topic. I'm also happy to stop beating
a dead unicorn.
Thanks, Mike
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Mike
Bergman
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2017 1:43 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of
Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective
Hi Jon,
On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
I guess the reason for my first two questions was
unclear. You said that the "idea of a unicorn" is real,
so I asked what you meant by "idea," and you replied
that your first reaction was to treat it as a
possibility. I thus (perhaps mis)interpreted you to be
saying that the "possibility of a unicorn" is real.
I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the
Object, and "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be
that you, as the Interpretant, take "unicorn" as the
Object? I think the only real that exists within the triad
is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the
Representamen as the "objects" of our attention.
This actually gets to the major topic of this list over
the past chunk of time, namely Nominalists v Realists.
My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared
to questioning what is real, and what is not. It seems
fundamental that the definition and demarcation of real
needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I was
perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm,
that when we talk about "Realism" there is not even
necessarily agreement about what that means.
What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that
the names of things were also confusing our ability to
think about those things. All of us know that unicorns
don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is obviously
so similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we
take the name (as a type) and its analogies (such as
horses, cows, marmosets), it is clear that unicorns are
not real. They do not share the aspects of tangibility,
actuality, perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with
"real" things like four-legged mammals. But we can
actually depict, describe and discuss unicorns, because we
have a firm idea of what being a unicorn means. The
"idea", "what that means", is the object represented by
the term "unicorn". That object is real, (because it can
be a part of meaningful argument), even though if limited
to thought and imagination.
I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be
labeled a nominalist, but this example shows just how
subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It pervades our
thought in sometimes less than obvious ways.
If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier)
generals are real, then it is legitimate to ask what the
boundaries are of the "real" definition. I have been
arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not know how
to define or segregate a general that is not real.
Unicorns, included.
But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or
not on this question, it still seems like the whole
Nominalist v Realist discussion can not be grounded until
the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. Names as
indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion.
Agreement on what is real is another.
I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get
resolved in this current thread.
MB: You continue the same error of understanding, in
my view, by using the label unicorn as the idea of the
thing unicorn.
How so? As you said, this is tricky, and I would like
to understand what you mean by this distinction, as well
as the specific error that you perceive me to be making.
I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a
nominalistic view of "unicorn" as a representative term
point to an animal analogue that under no empirical basis
is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you
maintain that unicorns are not real.
But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely
a label to the idea of an idealized animal, one with a
twisted nose horn to boot? That animal does not exist, is
a fiction of someone's imagination, and even though a
not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal
this object is not real, but it is an idea, and an idea
that is widely understood by many. We can talk about and
reason about unicorns, just as we can for Mars or gravity
or sustainability, all also things that we either accept
as things vouched by others or the product of thought.
None of us have experienced Mars, or understand gravity or
sustainability directly. Yet these are real, are they not?
So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is
not, then you can likely discriminate what is a name
versus what is real. That is the root of the Nominalist v
Realist question.
Thanks, Mike
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
wrote:
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
CEO Cognonto and Structured Dynamics
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://structureddynamics.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
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