Mike, List: This is a fascinating line of thought, and I appreciate you taking the time to spell it out. I anticipated that you might be going in this direction, and I have been wondering for a while about the reality of fictional objects like unicorns within a Peircean framework.
My own attempt at a concise definition of "real" is "capable of being represented, but independent of any actual representation." It is basically a paraphrase of Peirce's definition in "A Neglected Argument" for "Idea" (capitalized) as "that whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it" (CP 6.452), which I quoted previously. He later added, when identifying Ideas as the constituents of the first Universe of Experience, "the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455). Obviously a unicorn is capable of being represented, so the question becomes whether it is independent of any actual representation. This is where I am still on the fence. If no human had ever conceived the idea of a unicorn, would it still be real? If not, then its Being *does* consist in someone's actually thinking it; i.e., we are using "idea" in the (lowercase) sense of "the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy." A unicorn does not have one horn regardless of what any person or finite group of people think about it; it has one horn only *because* people think about it that way. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Feb 11, 2017 at 12:43 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi Jon, > On 2/10/2017 11:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Mike, List: > > I guess the reason for my first two questions was unclear. You said that > the "idea of a unicorn" is real, so I asked what you meant by "idea," and > you replied that your first reaction was to treat it as a possibility. I > thus (perhaps mis)interpreted you to be saying that the "possibility of a > unicorn" is real. > > I don't know, Jon. Think of "idea of a unicorn" as the Object, and > "unicorn" as the Representamen. Could it be that you, as the Interpretant, > take "unicorn" as the Object? I think the only real that exists within the > triad is the Object, unless we make the Interpretant or the Representamen > as the "objects" of our attention. > > This actually gets to the major topic of this list over the past chunk of > time, namely Nominalists v Realists. > > My initial sets of questions in this thread were geared to questioning > what is real, and what is not. It seems fundamental that the definition and > demarcation of *real* needs to be a starting point in that discussion. I > was perceiving, and responses to this thread tend to affirm, that when we > talk about "Realism" there is not even necessarily agreement about what > that means. > > What was also evident as this discussion unfolded is that the names of > things were also confusing our ability to think about those things. All of > us know that unicorns don't exist, and because our label "unicorns" is > obviously so similar, we assert unicorns are not real. Well, if we take the > name (as a type) and its analogies (such as horses, cows, marmosets), it is > clear that unicorns are not real. They do not share the aspects of > tangibility, actuality, perceptabiity, etc., that we associate with "real" > things like four-legged mammals. But we can actually depict, describe and > discuss unicorns, because we have a firm idea of what being a unicorn > means. The "idea", "what that means", is the object represented by the term > "unicorn". That object is real, (because it can be a part of meaningful > argument), even though if limited to thought and imagination. > > I know everyone on this list recoils in horror to be labeled a nominalist, > but this example shows just how subtle and pernicious nominalism is. It > pervades our thought in sometimes less than obvious ways. > > If we accept that thought and (some, Peirce's qualifier) generals are > real, then it is legitimate to ask what the boundaries are of the "real" > definition. I have been arguing for a broad view. I still honestly do not > know how to define or segregate a general that is not real. Unicorns, > included. > > But, whether my definition or boundaries is "correct" or not on this > question, it still seems like the whole Nominalist v Realist discussion can > not be grounded until the protagonists agree upon the meaning of terms. > Names as indexicals are one way to help cut through the confusion. > Agreement on what is real is another. > > I'm pretty sure a topic like this is not going to get resolved in this > current thread. > > MB: You continue the same error of understanding, in my view, by using > the label unicorn as the idea of the thing unicorn. > > > How so? As you said, this is tricky, and I would like to understand what > you mean by this distinction, as well as the specific error that you > perceive me to be making. > > I'm not in your head, but I think you are letting a nominalistic view of > "unicorn" as a representative term point to an animal analogue that under > no empirical basis is known to exist. Because no such animal exists, you > maintain that unicorns are not real. > > But what if the unicorn is not a real animal, but merely a label to the > idea of an idealized animal, one with a twisted nose horn to boot? That > animal does not exist, is a fiction of someone's imagination, and even > though a not-uncommon referent by many, is not actual. As an animal this > object is not real, but it is an idea, and an idea that is widely > understood by many. We can talk about and reason about unicorns, just as we > can for Mars or gravity or sustainability, all also things that we either > accept as things vouched by others or the product of thought. None of us > have experienced Mars, or understand gravity or sustainability directly. > Yet these are real, are they not? > > So, to sum, if you can define what is real and what is not, then you can > likely discriminate what is a name versus what is real. That is the root of > the Nominalist v Realist question. > > Thanks, Mike > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > >
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