Jon, Edwina, List,
- The representamen is the loud sound, and everything connected with it in the situation (as the representamen is also the sign, so including all following points too)
- The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the source of the loud sound, as this (imaginary) source really (not imaginary) is, and as it is in the concepts of all other birds and all other creatures,
- The immediate object is what is initially arisen (imagined) in the bird´s mind by the loud sound for being its source,
- The immediate interpretant is the reason the bird assumes having to fly away,
- The dynamical interpretant is really avoiding the (still imaginary) danger by flying away,
- The final interpretant is the real benefit achieved by the bird, defined by what would really have happened if the bird had not flown away.
This was a quick shot. Now I guess, maybe there is a pattern of combinations of "imaginary" and "real"...
02. Februar 2018 um 17:25 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover that, at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially in agreement after all.
- The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself.
- The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud sound.
- The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's neural pattern that stands for the loud sound.
- The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects of this neural pattern on the bird.
- The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this neural pattern on the bird, which is its flight.
What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line. This is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been wondering about for quite some time. You place them within (or as) the R, but I am still having a hard time seeing it that way in light of Peirce's definition (in multiple places) of the R as that which stands for the Object to the Interpretant. My sense is that these elements are instead somehow bound up in what it means for the Object to determine the Sign to determine the Interpretant; i.e., collateral experience is what enables the bird to "recognize" its sensation as corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit of interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what prompts the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the other possible effects.
One alternative is to designate the habit of interpretation as the one correlate that is missing above--the Final Interpretant (FI). Up until now, my working hypothesis has been that the FI is defined as the habit of feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of interpretation--that the Sign would produce. However, I had in mind the habit that the Receiver (in this case, the bird) would develop after sufficient repetition of the same Representamen (in this case, the neural pattern that stands for the loud sound). I am starting to wonder if instead we should define the FI as the general tendency that governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities that correspond to its II. The FI would then be the cumulative effect of all previous instances of semiosis that are somehow relevant to this particular encounter with this particular Sign.
I will stop there and ask again--what do you think? Feedback from others would also be very welcome.
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