Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, Jon S, list, > > At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than > with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this > matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few > quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added > by me in all cases). > > 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 > > …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our > outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it > calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…* > > > 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 > > A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its > interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] > sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that > thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the > other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an > immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the > deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.* > > > 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 > > A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for > something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, > creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more > developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of > the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands > for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, > which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is > here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in > everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches > another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was > thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which > when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so > far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is > to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant > of the interval a new idea. > > > 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 > > …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So > that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature > of a sign.* [—] > > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >
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