Gary R., List:

Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
non-cognitive example.


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman -

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond <>

> Edwina, Jon S, list,
> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
> with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
> matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
> quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
> by me in all cases).
> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant
> of the interval a new idea.
> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
> of a sign.* [—]
> Best,
> Gary R
> [image: Gary Richmond]
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
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